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Abstract
Defenses against adversarial attacks are essential to ensure the reliability of machine learning
models as their applications are expanding in different domains. Existing ML defense techniques
have several limitations in practical use. I proposed a trustworthy framework that employs an
adaptive strategy to inspect both inputs and decisions. In particular, data streams are examined by
a series of diverse filters before sending to the learning system and then crossed checked its
output through a diverse set of filters before making the final decision. My experimental results
illustrated that the proposed active learning-based defense strategy could mitigate adaptive or
advanced adversarial manipulations both in input and after with the model decision for a wide
range of ML attacks by higher accuracy. Moreover, the output decision boundary inspection using
a classification technique automatically reaffirms the reliability and increases the trustworthiness
of any ML-Based decision support system. Unlike other defense strategies, my defense technique
does not require adversarial sample generation, and updating the decision boundary for detection
makes the defense systems robust to traditional adaptive attacks.

iii

Table of Contents

1

2

List of Tables

vi

List of Figures

ix

Introduction
1.0.1 Contribution

1
4

Background
Artificial intelligence (AI)
2.1.1 Machine Learning (ML)
2.1.2 Neural Networks (NN)
2.1.3 Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
2.1.4 Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
2.2.1 Adversarial Sample Generation Methods
2.2.2 Defense Against Adversarial Attacks
2.3 Preliminaries
2.3.1 Metrics
2.3.2 Filter Techniques
2.3.3 Genetic Algorithm (GA)
2.3.4 Negative Selection Algorithm
2.3.5 One class classifications (OCC)

8
8
8
9
12
12
15
18
26
30
30
32
40
41
44

Proposed research
Goal and Objectives
Basic Architecture
Use Standard Data sets
3.3.1 ML Dataset
3.3.2 Generated Adversarial Dataset
3.4 Threat models
3.4.1 Attack types
3.4.2 Attack Samples generation
3.5 Preliminary Experiments
3.5.1 Applicability issue of Adversarial Attacks
3.5.2 Adversarial Input detection
3.5.3 Identifying Vulnerability

46
46
51
53
53
55
55
55
56
57
57
62
63

2.1

3

3.1
3.2
3.3

iv

4

5

Step by Step Investigation
4.1 Input Filters (library)
4.1.1 Feature Extraction strategy
4.2 Ensemble the Input Filters
4.3 Generation of filter Sequence
4.3.1 Filter Sequence Search Space
4.3.2 GA Methodology
4.3.3 Experimental Results and analysis
4.4 Output Filters
4.4.1 Negative Selection Based Filtering technique
4.4.2 Feature Selection
4.4.3 Result Analysis

68
68
68
73
76
79
81
92
96
96
98
100

Integrated Filtering- End-to-End
Research Findings
Overall Architecture
Workflow
5.3.1 Multi-objective Genetic Search for filters
5.3.2 One class classifications Outlier method
5.3.3 Adaptiveness and dynamic selection
5.4 Experiments
5.4.1 Dataset Generation
5.4.2 Result Analysis
5.5 Comparison
5.6 Robustness Evaluation
5.7 Summary

102
102
107
111
111
116
118
120
120
128
130
131
133

5.1
5.2
5.3

6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4

Real-World Application
Proof-of-the-Concept Prototype
Experiments
Scope and Limitations
Lessons Learned

135
136
136
136
137

References

138

v

List of Tables

2.1
2.2
2.3

Some Notable Adversarial Attack methods
Summary of countermeasures against adversarial examples[47].
Acronym used in this proposal

3.1

Here, I scored based on equation of Fscore from My study of different defense
techniques. (Some of these scores are an approximation based My understanding)
In the last column, the overall score is presented. Based on the overall score I can
see Some of the techniques have better usability than others.
Summary of Threat Models and associated manipulation strategies and dataset
used for experimentation.
Destruction rates of various attack types under different environmental conditions.
The values in column “Normal” indicate destruction rates under raw image and
following columns represent where the successful attack types in normal conditions
are experimented with other conditions. In resize, I re-scaled the image and turn
backward to original sizes. To simulate motion effect I used Gaussian blur with
different sigma value. For illumination effect I increased the brightness. I can see
the destruction rates gets higher when rotate and motions are higher. Adversarial
patch’es have lower destruction rate.
In first four columns under the Destruction rate without threshold, I show percentages of adversarial samples failed to remain as adversarial. Next four columns
show the adversarial rate among the adversarial samples which satisfied My threshold value. In the last four columns I provided the adversarial samples destruction
rate when threshold value increases 30% more.
Using four common transformation technique to distinguish between adversarial
samples and common samples (From MNIST). I used 20000 clean images avg Signal to noise ratio(SNR) as threshold. Attack images which have higher SNR than
the threshold are identified as adversarial images . Here I provided the detection
rates. I can observe that CW and Deepfool Detecting is harder.
Different attack points and relevant responsible professional

3.2
3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6
4.1
4.2

Different ilters for different adversarial attack type
List of the filters and their accuracy against different attack (250 adversarial inputs
for each attack type) on MNIST dataset (ACOORD.net library used for experiment) (Note: here we only provided successful detection rate).

vi

19
27
36

49
55

57

60

63
67
72

75

4.3

Smaller sequences have similar performance as long sequences, but take less computational time. Here, Sequence 1 is consists of all the filters and has the same
accuracy for different AAs (here, four specific AA result from ten different filters
provided) as shorter sequence (2) but with less time.
4.4 Accuracy,Time, and diversity After applied different Series of filter for MNIST
dataset
4.5 Metrics of Adversarial samples and clean samples from each filter used to train
different ML and their accuracy
4.6 A comparison between single vs. dual objective (diversity and accuracy) GA sequences is presented. Single objective GA sequences have a larger drop in mean
accuracy rate (F1-score) than the dual objective.
4.7 Here, we provided a comparison with other adversarial input detection techniques
based on Accuracy. On average, we outperform other methods. As examples,
our methods work with 96% accuracy in the CFIAR data-set where the feature
squeezing technique has 0.88% accuracy.
4.8 Detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with
clean input of class label ’0’ , after sample size increased 100 in each step.
4.9 detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with
clean input of class label ’0’
4.10 adversarial attacks on MNIST class label ’0-3’ and CIFAR ’dog’ and ’airplane’
class detection rate (each class has 200 positive and 200 adversarial samples which
classifies as that class by a CNN)
4.11 Comparison with other adversarial input detection technique based on accuracy (in
our method, for MNIST average of class 0-3 was experimented and for CIFAR
only tested with Airplane and dog class)
4.12 Advantages of our proposed method than other methods in terms of applicability
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9

76
94
94

95

95
97
98

98

99
99

List of outlier detection algorithm and their accuracy to detect adversarial (FGSM)
input of class label ’O’.
106
Detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with
clean input of class label ’0’ , after sample size increased 100 in each step.
117
detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with
clean input of class label ’0’.
118
Adversarial type classification for MNIST dataset for Clean, FGSM, JSMA, and CW.125
Binary classification for MNIST dataset for Clean and Adversarial ( FGSM, JSMA,
and CW).
125
Adversarial type classification for MNIST dataset for Clean, FGSM, JSMA, and
CW after applied histogram and SNR based features.
126
Binary classification for MNIST dataset for Clean and Adversarial ( FGSM, JSMA,
and CW) after apply SNR and Histogram features.
126
Confusion matrix of MNIST adversarial input detections using SNR and histogram
value.
127
Comparison of results with different outlier detection models to compare V-detector
NSA performance with other OCC methods.
128

vii

5.10 adversarial attacks on CFIAR and Imagenet detection rate (each class has 200 positive and 200 adversarial samples which classifies as that class by a Alexnet for
imagenet and VGG-16 for CFIAR).
5.11 Here, we provided a comparison with other adversarial input detection techniques
based on Accuracy. On average, we outperforms other methods. As examples,
our methods work with 99% accuracy in the CFIAR data-set where the feature
squeezing technique has 0.88% accuracy.
5.12 Different probabilistic method for adversarial robustness

viii

129

130
133

List of Figures

1.1
1.2
1.3
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24

Adversarial attack examples on face biometric. Adding a special sunglass can able
to fool the face biometric.
Adversarial attack example on text (the green color word ’signs’ changed to ’signal’
which change the output class ’Entailment’ to ’Contradiction’
Adversarial attack example on Audio (normal audio record can be used as a voice
command to access smart home)
AI classification [111]
ML classification [187]
Neural Network example [89]
Neural Network Classification [193]
A simple convolutional neural network[170]
A simple example[170]
A simple Lenet-5[98]
A simple VGG-16[98]
A simple Resnet[98]
Evasion attack and poisoning attack [86]
Adversarial Attack Types [86]
Adversarial Attack Generation methods types in whitebox model [35]
Trojan AI[128]
Backdoor attack[69]
Fast sign Gradient method [106]
Basic Iterative Method [106]
JSMA Attack generation [154]
CW attack Examples [30]
Boundary Based Attack
Adaptive filtering
Additive Noise
Fourier transformation effect
Gabor transformation effect
The basic Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) [45] similar to any two-phase supervised learning algorithms. The left diagram shows detector generation in the
complementary space (training phase) and the right illustrates the use of detectors
(testing phase).

ix

2
3
3
9
10
10
11
13
13
14
15
15
17
17
18
20
21
21
22
22
23
25
32
34
38
39

41

2.25 A real-valued NSA for generating variable-size detectors (V-detector) with statistical estimate of complementary space coverage[94]. Here N number of the detector,
’x’ is number of positive point, ’P’ is probability and α is target coverage, n is sample size.
3.1
3.2
3.3

My Proposed Bench-marking Process with sample data. Here I tried to represent
some common defense techniques in a radar map.
Schematic of the proposed Dual-Filtering (DF) framework.
Generalized adversarial attack points on ML model

First rows show how different types of attack change a clean image (for visual
purpose, the effects are exaggerated. This row is created from observation and not
real sample). The second rows are actual corresponding real attacks on the MNIST
dataset. Where 8 recognized as a different label.
4.2 In the top side, Clean (class A) vs Adversarial (B which classified as other class)
images differences after Filter Set applied, Histogram calculation on the difference,
In bottom, MNIST with FGSM example has shown
4.3 Effects of Several Filters techniques on CIFAR dataset.after applying different Filters, DI was done from grey-scaled image
4.4 In the right side, clean (0), FGSM(1) and JSMA(2) samples were applied with AS
Filters and using KNN[225] with the Histogram average value of DI and euclidean
distance value,Similarly in the left side, clean (0), FGSM(1) and JSMA(3) and
DF(2) samples were applied with AN + AS Filters s effects. I can see DF, Jsma is
overlapping there.
4.5 4 Filters applied to 5 types of the adversarial set with a clean sample set for the
MNIST dataset. In X-axis, no of each sample shows and Y axis, Before and after effects histogram average has been illustrated. From this small set I can see,
different Filters has different effects for different attack types
4.6 Effects of Several Filters techniques on MNIST dataset, after applying different
Filters
4.7 Here, the transformation of additive noise and adaptive smoothing filter and the difference between original and filtered images are illustrated. We use the histogram
value from the difference image as my feature metrics. On the right side, fourier
transformation effect and SNR values difference of adversarial and clean input
value. We can also notice a pattern in the red arrow between adversarial(FGSM)
and clean images.
4.8 Genetic Algorithm (GA) for generating filter sequence list
4.9 Flow chart in different stage of operation.
4.10 Both sequence has 95% accuracy(Not F1) and same size but top sequence has less
time.Steps of adversarial input, detecting sequential by each filter is presented, we
can see that reordering these sequences will change the number of undetected images for the next filter. So for different sequence processed time varies but detection
accuracy remain same. (Note: here a simple example used for illustration, where
FT1 and FT2 has no overlap detection)

43
50
51
64

4.1

x

69

70
71

71

72
73

74
79
80

81

4.11 Here, X-Axis is the generated sequence, and the y-axis has the detection accuracy
of the sequences. In blue, we represented the average random sequence, and in
orange, we have sequences after 20 iterations of a GA for the SHAPE dataset
using 12filters. We can see that randomly select a sequence has a meager chance to
have good accuracy, whereas choosing a sequence from GA results will guarantee
higher accuracy.
4.12 Population of GA represented, Here each individuals are variable length, In crossover
and mutation duplicate occurrences were removed. Different order of sequence
provide same accuracy but different time as we can see for sequence 4 and 6. Three
objectives were presented we can see longer length does not guarantee accuracy or
diversity
4.13 ’Insider Diversity’ and ’Set Diversity’ Explanation, In the Left side, we can see
two sequences where one has insider diversity one has not, and left side, we can
see which set has the set diversity.
4.14 Here, X-Axis is the iteration number, and Y-axis has presented the average of
α(s)∀S. We can see that some of the filters dominate at the top whenever we
reach a local optimum. We save these sequences and remove these filters from the
rest of the population. The immediate effect of the average accuracy dropped, but
that picked up again. We continue to drop off dominated filters until the x-axis is
stuck in a lower optimum than the threshold.
4.15 Here X-axis has the iteration number, and the Y-axis has the average length of the
sequence. We can see with a penalty, the average size of the sequence tends to
smaller. This experiment was done with 12 filters with 4 different datasets.
4.16 MOGA Pareto front and performances illustrated.
4.17 Y-axis presents the diversity value, and the X-axis represents the total number of
experiments. The difference in diversity values from sequences generated by different GA method is illustrated. After GA generated sequence, we randomly picked
three sequences seven times and showed their total diversity value. We can see
with drop off functionality, we reach maximum diversity. Without drop off and
diversity objectives, it failed to cover half of the family.This experiment was done
in MNIST dataset
4.18 For N iterations best accuracy and best time-cost were plotted. Here we can see
time and accuracy were not equally progressed. But after we get a good F1 score
individuals time started to improved.
4.19 For N iterations, average accuracy and best accuracy was plotted. We can see that
in the initial state when the sequence was utterly random, accuracy was below 50%,
but after several iterations, it started to go higher
4.20 Here X-axis has the iteration number, and the Y-axis has fitness. We can see for
MNIST without accuracy, GA requires 63 iterations to reach a fitness over 98.
Whereas with the weight, we can get the same fitness by 40 iterations. This experiment was done with 12 filters with MNIST, EMNIST, F-MNIST, Shape Dataset,
and CFIAR dataset.

xi

82

83

83

84

88
89

91

92

93

93

4.21 Here, We are searching S number of sequences with accuracy over 85% only using
brute force and random forest search. For filter size 10, we weren’t able to complete
the brute force search. It is visible using GA higher accuracy filters can be found by
less search from the bars. The random search may be suitable for a lower number
of filters, but the random search takes a large coverage area than the GA search
when the filter size is large.
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4

96
103
103
108

5.14

Two different phenomenon PH5 and PH6 observed.
Two different phenomenon 7 and 3 observed.
Schematic of the proposed Dual-Filtering (DF) framework.
Illustration of basic flow concept for proposed Dual Inspection framework. If the
input is not adversarial, the original input (not the processed) be sent to the learning
model/ML and after ML produce class label, that labels latent space will be used
in outlier method. The outlier decision boundary and the threshold of noise will
change as the dataset of adversarial and clean data set are updated by each input.
Illustration of proposed Dual Inspection framework. If the input is not adversarial,
the original input (not the processed) be sent to the learning model/ML and after
ML produce class label, that labels latent space will be used in outlier method.
Selection of outlier and filer sequence will be dynamic.
GA to search appropriate filters.
PCA based clustering for class label 0, and 1 from MNIST dataset using each class
own latent space.
FGSM based adversarial input differs from their target class using filtered metrics
presented using PCA for dimensional reduction.
Experimental data representation space for each class of MNIST digits.
Experimental data representation space(Here clean is green, red is FGSM, blue is
JSMA and yellow is CW).
Experimental data representation space after filter applied with one metrics(Here
clean is green, red is FGSM, blue is JSMA and yellow is CW).
Experimental data representation space after filter applied with two metrics.
Experimental data representation space for each class of MNIST digits with adversarial attack Here clean is blue, red is fgsma, green is JSMA and yellow is CW).
Different robustness verification techniques [120]

6.1

Medical Imaging Dataset

135

5.5

5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13

xii

109

112
113
117
117
121
122
122
123
124
133

Chapter 1
Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) techniques have recently attained impressive performances on diverse
and challenging problems such as malware/intrusion detection, image classification, object
detection, speech recognition, face recognition in-the-wild, self-driving vehicles, just to name a
few. In spite of their major breakthroughs in solving complex tasks, it has been lately discovered
that ML techniques (especially artificial neural networks and data-driven artificial intelligence)
are highly vulnerable to deliberately crafted samples either at training or at test time, which can
easily subvert ML techniques’ outcomes. The samples with deliberate perturbations are usually
referred as ‘adversarial examples’ (a.k.a. wild pattern or adversarial attack), i.e.,
carefully-perturbed samples aimed to mislead the ML techniques. For instance, the arbitrary
perturbations added in the benign malware binary vector/file can lead to a significant drop in
accuracy of DNNs-based malware detection systems. Similarly, for image classification ML
techniques, an adversarial example can be generated by adding some indiscernible perturbations
into a given image. The resultant adversarial image is misclassified by the well-known ML
classifiers, while a human being can still classify it correctly without spotting the deliberate added
perturbations. In case of automatic speech-to-text transcription, a small perturbation (e.g., an
arbitrary waveform) when added to the original waveform can cause it to be transcribed as any
phrase malicious adversary chooses. The audio adversarial examples that are perceived one way
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by a human but transcribed differently by a state-of-the-art speech-to-text transcription neural
network. Also, an adversary can malignly modify labels of the samples to be used for
(re-)training of ML techniques, which is known as poisoning attacks.
To safeguard ML techniques against malicious adversary, several countermeasure schemes
have been proposed, which roughly fall within two categories: adversarial defense and adversarial
detection. Frameworks in first category aim at improving the DNNs’ robustness to classify AEs
correctly, e.g., adversarial training, i.e., training the ML techniques with clean and malicious
samples. While the frameworks in second category attempt to detect malicious samples before
they are fed to ML technique’s main architecture such as augmenting the ML technique’s main
model with a small “detector” sub-ML technique trained on both adversarial and original clean
samples, which can be utilized to distinguish whether the input sample is an adversarial attack or
not. Despite the current progress on increasing robustness of ML techniques against malicious
attacks, the majority of existing countermeasures still do not scale well and have low
generalization. Namely, adversaries (adversarial samples/input) yet pose great threats to machine
learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI).
In figure 1.1,1.3 and 1.2, I illustrated three examples of adversarial attacks. In the first
example, one person can change just by wearing an adversarial patch printed glass, In 1.2
example, a simple change of word changing the output class of the paragraph. and in the 1.3, it is
illustrated that normal day to day speech can change by little noise.

Figure 1.1: Adversarial attack examples on face biometric. Adding a special sunglass can able to
fool the face biometric.
Modern society immensely relies on highly interconnected cyberspace, which is prone to
2

Figure 1.2: Adversarial attack example on text (the green color word ’signs’ changed to ’signal’
which change the output class ’Entailment’ to ’Contradiction’

Figure 1.3: Adversarial attack example on Audio (normal audio record can be used as a voice
command to access smart home)
vulnerabilities. For instance, from daily online shopping, cloud computing platforms to remotely
controlled devices (i.e., Internet of Things) can be attacked or manipulated by adversaries. In
particular, sample manipulations (adversarial attacks) may lead societies and individuals to untold
risks with severe consequences. Sophisticated cyber adversaries are very difficult to detect and
have severe negative impact on automated ML/AI. ML/AI based systems are exponentially being
applied in diverse set of applications such as border crossing, autonomous vehicles, thus their
security is paramount.
The proposed framework will be a game-changer in developing trustworthy ML systems
and is very relevant to secure and trustworthy cyberspace programs. The successful outcome of
this research will provide an additional layer of defense shield against attacks on learning
systems. The outcome of this research will make it harder to attack any ML system without
revealing specific attack methods. It will save a biometric (face+voice) recognition-based
authentication system being attacked by hackers. ML-based applications such as intrusion
detection techniques, news classifications, search engine optimizations, email spam filtering,
video surveillance, Object detection applications are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. My
findings will able to protect these applications from being exposed to adversarial attacks.

3

1.0.1

Contribution

We contributed a robust filtering schemes for machine learning systems to defend Adversarial
Attacks which provide end to end protection. Our scheme incorporated with a diversity
preserving variable-length MOGA for search set of Filters that are effective against a different
type of AAs input as input filers and devised an adaptive negative filtering methodology to detect
adversarial attacks that do not modify the ML model or information about the ML model but
consistent with ML model outputs that able to capture TROJAI or backdoor. Our strategy can be
implemented in any ML-based system without expensive retraining. Current Adaptive attacks are
ineffective in our negative filtering approach as they are regenerating for each input. To
summarize, the dissertation will address the aforementioned limitations in current state-of-the-art
adversarial defenses and make the following contributions.
• Identify natures of adversarial attacks. I will identify some natural phenomenon of
adversarial attacks and established benchmarks of adversarial attacks and defense.
• Devise a defense strategy independent of MLM knowledge I will design a defense method
which will not require any MLM knowledge.
• Explore input filters using Genetic Algorithm The primary purpose of input filters is to
prevent adversarial input data in such a way that can differentiate data manipulation from
the trained data. It will be examining the input by deploying application-specific filter
sequence. A set of filter sequences are selected (from a given library of filters) using an
efficient search and optimization algorithm, called multi-objective genetic algorithm
(MOGA). The MOGA can find a sequence of filters (where each filter can detect
adversarial traits/noises) satisfying constrains and three objectives: detection of the
maximum number of attacks with higher accuracy (above a specific threshold), with
minimum processing time, and shorter sequence of ensemble filters. By utilizing the
Pareto-set from MOGA runs, and picking a filter sequence dynamically at different times,
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make filter selections unpredictable and use an active learning approach in order to protect
the ML from adaptive attacks.
• Output filter after MLM: Employ several class-specific latent space-based transformation
for outlier detection. After MLM provides an output class label, it is then verified if the
output falls in that class’s latent space or not. I will make an ensemble of different outlier
detection methods and sequence dynamically and also retrain the outlier methods runtime.
Publications
Publications resulted from my research as below:
• Patent: System for Dual-Filtering for Learning Systems to Prevent Adversarial Attacks.
63/022,323
• Conference:
– Gupta, Kishor Datta, Dipankar Dasgupta, and Zahid Akhtar. "Adversarial Input
Detection Using Image Processing Techniques (IPT)." In 2020 11th IEEE Annual
Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics Mobile Communication Conference
(UEMCON), pp. 0309-0315. IEEE, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.1109/UEMCON51285.2020.9298060 [75]
– Gupta, Kishor Datta, Dipankar Dasgupta, and Zahid Akhtar. "Applicability issues of
evasion-based adversarial attacks and mitigation techniques." In 2020 IEEE
Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (SSCI), pp. 1506-1515. IEEE,
2020. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSCI47803.2020.9308589 [76]
– Gupta, Kishor Datta, and Dipankar Dasgupta. "Using Negative Detectors for
Identifying Adversarial Data Manipulation in Machine Learning" In 2021
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), Shenzhen, China,
July18–22, 2021. [73]
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• Journal:
– Gupta, Kishor Datta and Dipankar Dasgupta. “Dual-Filtering (DF) Schemes for
Learning Systems to prevent Adversarial Attacks” Journal: Springer Complex
Intelligent Systems, Manuscript ID: CAIS-D-21-00347, Submission date: March
2021. (under review)
– Gupta, Kishor Datta, and Dipankar Dasgupta. “Adaptive Ensemble of Filters (AEF) to
Detect Adversarial Inputs” Journal:IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in
Computational Intelligence (TETCI) (under Review)
– Gupta, Kishor Datta, Dipankar Dasgupta, and Zahid Akhtar. “Determining Sequence
of Image Processing Technique (IPT) to Detect Adversarial Attacks” Journal:
Springer Nature Computer Science, Manuscript ID: SNCS-D-20-01775, Submission
date: October 2020. (Accepted) [77],
– Gupta, Kishor Datta, Dipankar Dasgupta, and Zahid Akhtar. Negative Selection
Algorithm Research and Applications in the last decade: A Review” Journal: IEEE
Transaction of Artificial Intelligence, Submission date: May 2021. (Under second
review),
Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: The second chapter discusses the preliminary
topics which are related to this dissertation. An extensive literature study on adversarial attack
and defenses are presented here.
In the third chapter, I detailed my goals and objectives. I also introduced the basic
structure of my proposed defense system. I also presented the data set used to conduct
experiments. I also briefly described my threat model, which I use to evaluate my defense
strategy. This section also has detailed preliminary investigations and findings of my study.
In the fourth chapter, I explained how I ensemble input filter library and what are the
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features used for that. The Multi-objective Genetic algorithm employed to search a suitable set of
the sequence is described herein detailed. This section also discusses how outlier detection
methodology can work for adversarial input detection tasks.
Chapter five briefly detailed all our research findings and how they will be employed to
develop an end-to-end filtering scheme. I described the architecture and workflow in this section.
Also, compare with other defense methods and gave a complete result analysis.
In chapter six, I concluded my dissertation with a proof of concept application and
summary of dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, I will discuss different adversarial attacks, their properties, filter techniques,
adversarial defense techniques, and other terminology used in this proposal.

2.1

Artificial intelligence (AI)

If any machine demonstrates that it can make a decision based on its perception of its
environment, then this demonstration is known as Artificial Intelligence[135]. Machine Learning,
Natural Language Processing, Evolutionary algorithms, Search algorithm, Mathematical
Optimization all considered part of Artificial Intelligence.

2.1.1

Machine Learning (ML)

Machine Learning considered a subpart of the Artificial Intelligence domain. The difference
between machine learning and other types of artificial intelligence is that machine learning is
data-centric, not decision-based, and it focuses on accuracy rather than success. Machine
Learning is the learning in which machines can learn on their own without being explicitly
programmed. It is a form of AI that renders the device with the capability to learn and develop
from events automatically. It has a self-learning algorithm, and it has extensive relationships with
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Figure 2.1: AI classification [111]
statistics [134].

2.1.2

Neural Networks (NN)

Neural Networks is a set of the algorithm used to recognize pattern based on numerous iteration
of training data which claims to be similar to human brain function. Here initial a supervised
dataset used to train a set of nodes. Where nodes have initial weight values are random. By each
iteration from input data to output class, error differences affect the weight values after a certain
number of repetitions and backpropagation weight values are set in a way that any new input data
that weights can forward them to the right output. [89]. In the Figure 2.4, output value is male and
female based on age, height and empathy values which a neural network model is classifying the
input data. Neural networks uses some activation function which determines what a output node
will generate some examples of these functions are TANH, SOFTMAX, RELU etc.
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Figure 2.2: ML classification [187]

Figure 2.3: Neural Network example [89]
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Figure 2.4: Neural Network Classification [193]
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2.1.3

Deep Neural Networks (DNN)

Deep Neural Networks is a subset of neural network families that can use a higher level of raw
feature data from input to generate output. As an example, to detect a face in an image standard
neural network will take information such as histogram data, edge data, number of object data and
their positions, etc. etc. But deep learning neural networks can receive a full image as input and
can detect the face [115]. Four fundamental deep learning networks are:
• Unsupervised Pre-trained Networks
• Convolutional Neural Networks
• Recurrent Neural Networks
• Recursive Neural Networks
Unsupervised Pre-trained Networks instates a discriminative neural net from one which was
prepared utilizing an unaided basis, A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is essentially a
standard neural system that has been stretched out crosswise over space utilizing shared loads.
CNN is intended to perceive pictures by having convolutions inside, which see the edges of an
article perceived on the picture. A Recurrent Neural Network(RNN) is fundamentally a standard
neural system that has been stretched out crosswise over time by having edges which feed into
whenever step rather than into the following layer in a similar time step. RNN is intended to
perceive arrangements, for instance, a discourse signal or a content. It has cycles inside that infers
the nearness of short memory in the net. A Recursive Neural Network is progressively similar to a
various leveled arrange where there is actually no time viewpoint to the information grouping
however the info must be handled progressively in a tree design.

2.1.4

Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)

Convolutional neural network is a one type of deep neural network where a set of processing layer
added before a fully connected neural network. This convolutional network preporcess the image
12

Figure 2.5: A simple convolutional neural network[170]

Figure 2.6: A simple example[170]
thus no image feature extraction needed out side this network. in the figure 2.5 we can see an
example of basic diagram of a CNN. First layer of CNN is a Convolutional layer, In convolutional
layer a matrix know as kernel or filter applied into the image and create an image, next step is
pooling step, this step reduce the size of the image, there are max pooling or average pooling and
some other types of pooling exist. After several convolutional and pooling step image features get
flatten one dimentional input and it applied to a fully connected neural network part. Sometime
with convolutional neural network several activation functions are used like Rectified linear Unit,
TanH function etc. In the example 2.6 , we can see first an image converted to differnet model
than a RELU activation functional changed that after again some pooling applied on it, after sever
of this process repetation in the end we get a feature list to give fully connected layer, and that
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Figure 2.7: A simple Lenet-5[98]
layer give ’car’ most confidence than other output class. There are different models of CNN
currenly in use, but some of the most famous models are
• LeNet-5
• AlexNet
• VGG-16
• Inception-v1
• Inception-v3
• ResNet-50
• Xception
• Inception-v4
• Inception-ResNets
• ResNeXt-50
We will describe Lenet5, ResNet and VGG-16 and as they are most widely use for adversarial
attack research.
LeNet-5
Lenet is most simple of all, it has 2 conv and 3 FC layer. In the figure 2.7 a Lenet-5 has shown.
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Figure 2.8: A simple VGG-16[98]

Figure 2.9: A simple Resnet[98]

VGG-16
Visuak Geometry Group develop VGG-16 neural network architecture which has 13 conv and 3
FC, each conv attached with a RELU layer. It use very simple size kernels suc as 3X3 oe 2X2. In
the figure 2.8 a VGG-16 has shown.
Resnet
Resnet introduces a identity block which is used with conv and max pool layer before connected
to FC layer. Most of the adversarial examlples we going to introduce in next few chapters have
been developed on Resnet architecture. . In the figure 2.9 a ResNet has shown.

2.2

Adversarial Machine Learning

Based on NIST [189] definition, adversarial machine learning is the manipulation of training data,
ML model architecture, or manipulate testing data in a way that will result in wrong output from
ML. The rationale behind AA’s success has no conclusive explanation. In 2014, [188, 74] states
the reason is non-linearity, but [65] proclaims it is for too much linearity. Another theory by
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[190], proposed a tilted boundary theory and insisted that it is never feasible to fit a model
completely, and that’s why Adversarial attacks exist. Some MIT researchers stated that all
adversarial features are not noise, rather these data cannot be properly classified because human
sensors are not sophisticated enough to associate a class for these data, however this argument is
disputed by other researchers[87].
From the NIST definition, I can define three basic types of AAs as[86]
1. Poisoning attack: In this attack, the attacker can corrupt training data and create adversarial
examples later to work on the model. It happens in training time.
2. Evasion attack: In this attack, testing inputs change in a way that they miss-classify to
another random or targeted class.
3. Trojan AI attack: In this attack, the AI model’s architecture changes in a way it
miss-classifies the input.
Generally speaking, adversarial examples are input data which get miss-classified by an AI
method but not by a human eye. In mathematical definition:
For a ML model M , if A is Non adversarial input and right class label is CR , added noise
is , Now,adversarial example Ax = A + , Ax classify by M as class CW where (CW 6= CR ), But
if in human eye Ax ≈ A and Ax classify as CR ,
Poisoning Attack
In training time, the attacker can corrupt training data and create adversarial examples later to
work on the model. In figure 2.10, It is illustrated that malicious training data was given to the
model with training data until the desired outcome start to happen. Outilier detection is the most
common approach to tackle this attack.
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Evasion Attack
In this attack, testing images are change in a way that they miss-classify to another random or
targeted class. This attack is transferable to any ML model. It can observe that to classify an
object in an image; the neural network doesn’t seem able to identify the object features. Such as,
the difference between plane and car doesn’t depend on the background is sky or ground or which
one has wings and which one has large windows. It depends on color pixel values in certain
positions.

Figure 2.10: Evasion attack and poisoning attack [86]
This evasion attack can divide into two sides based on knowledge, which is also known as
the white-box-black box model as illustrated in figure 2.11. In a white-box attacker knows details
of the model in black box attacker only knows the output decision. Also, based on the
misclassification class, it can be separated into two types one is targeted, and another is
non-targeted. When anyone manipulate an image from one level to sure, another class can be said
targeted adversarial attack. And when miss-classify to any other type can be assumed
non-targeted attack.

Figure 2.11: Adversarial Attack Types [86]
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Figure 2.12: Adversarial Attack Generation methods types in whitebox model [35]

Troj AI
If a deep learning network architecture is modified by and adversarial after its training completed,
then that deep learning network has a Troj-AI[216]. In figure 2.13, illustrated how a trojan-trigger
in the network changing the output of results by manipulating the network. It first gathers
information about what should be the input data needed to be a definite class. Based on that it
changes the architectural weights. Another One of the Troj-AI examples is Backdoor system [69]
In Figure 2.14, It is illustrated how a back door can be added to generate new results.

2.2.1

Adversarial Sample Generation Methods

For a successful attack, attacker need to generate adversarial samples/inputs. Generally speaking,
Adversarial samples/Inputs are input data which get miss-classified by an Artificial Intelligence
but not by a human eye.
Rauber et al.[162] proposed three basic methods of attack they are gradient-based,
score-based, and decision based. In figure 2.15, different types based on their methods is
illustrated. In figure 2.12, it is presented that, in the white box model, an attacker can use
gradients of neural nodes. For score-based, it only has the output layer class values, and for a
decision based on it can only have the final result. In the black-box model, he doesn’t have the
target ML model to try his attack samples.
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Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)[65]
Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM) [28]
Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [154]
DeepFool (DF) [143]
One-Step Target Class Method (OSTCM) [112]
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [112]
Iterative Least-Likely Class Method (ILLC) [112]
Compositional Pattern-Producing

Ground-Truth Attack (GTA) [151]
Zero-Query Attacks (ZQA) [151]
Natural Evolution Strategies (NES) [88]
Boundary Attack (BA) [20]
Greedy Search Algorithm (GSA) [110]
Genetic Attack (GA) [8]
Improved Genetic Algorithm (IGA) [205]
Probability Weighted Word

Network-Encoded Evolutionary
Saliency (PWWS) [164]
Algorithm (CPPN EA) [147]
Replacement, Insertion and Removal of
Carlini and Wagner’s Attack (C&W) [30]
Words (RI&RoW) [113]
Real-World Noise (RWN) [113]
Targeted Audio Adversarial

Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO) [37]
Universal Perturbation (UP) [144]

Examples (TAAE) [29]
Genetic Algorithms and Gradient
Estimation (GA&GE) [192]
HopSkipJumpAttack (HSJ) [35]
Backward Pass Differentiable
Approximation (BPDA) [32]
Adversarial Patch Attack (DPATCH)[125]
LaVAN: Localized and Visible

One Pixel Attack (OPA) [186]
Feature Adversary (FA) [168]
Hot/Cold method (H/C) [186]
Natural GAN (NGAN) [231]
Model-based Ensembling Attack (MEA) [126]

Adversarial Noise [99]
Table 2.1: Some Notable Adversarial Attack methods
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Figure 2.13: Trojan AI[128]

Gradient Based Attacks
In 2014 Fast gradient Sign method was proposed by Ian Goodfellow which is most known
Gradient Based Attack [65]. This method computes an adversarial image by adding a pixel-wide
perturbation of magnitude in the direction of the gradient. This perturbation is computed with a
0

single step, thus is very efficient in terms of computation time. A simple formulation if Here, x is
the adversarial example that should look similar to x when  is small, and y is the models output.
 is a small constant that controls the magnitude of the perturbation, and J denotes the loss
function of the model.
0

x = x +  × sign(∆x J(x, y))

(2.1)

This attack type is white-box attack, cause attacker need to know the neural network and
the gradient value so he can perform back propagation to calculate the derivative of the entropy
w.r.t to its input.
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Figure 2.14: Backdoor attack[69]

Figure 2.15: Fast sign Gradient method [106]
In figure 2.16, it is illustrated that additive adversarial perturbations based on dL/dx and
iterative optimization based attacks. Once dL/dx is calculated (step 1), one may view the attack
process as a game where a player (the attacker) can adjust the pixel values (step 2) of the input
based on some hints, i.e. the gradient dL/dx, to fool a model (step 3). Another up-gradation of
this type is deepfool attack. DeepFool is a simple yet very effective attack [143] . In each iteration
it computes for each class l¬l0 the minimum distance d(l¬l0 ) that it takes to reach the class
boundary by approximating the model classifier with a linear classifier. It then makes a
corresponding step in the direction of the class with the smallest distance.
Saliency Map Attack
The Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack is a class of adversarial attack techniques for deceiving
classification models. In the digital vision, a saliency map is an image that shows each pixel’s
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Figure 2.16: Basic Iterative Method [106]

Figure 2.17: JSMA Attack generation [154]
unique quality. The purpose of a saliency map is to simplify and improve the representation of a
picture into something more significant and more suitable to analyze. For instance, if a pixel has a
high grey level or other unique color quality in a color image, that pixel’s class will show in the
saliency map and in an obvious way. Saliency is a kind of picture segmentation.
In the figure 2.17, first detect the saliency of image, From the saliency map of the image, it
get highest bit positions, As in pictures yellow points are highest, it now increase pixels values
arround these point until it got targeted class change.
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Figure 2.18: CW attack Examples [30]

Optimization based attack
The Limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS) is a non-linear gradient
based numerical optimization algorithm. This method extended in CW method by modifying the
loss function. The Carlini and Wagner (CW) (Carlini and Wagner, 2017) method is an iterative
attack that constructs adversarial examples by approximately solving the minimization problem
[215]. CW is a bit different from the above gradient-based methods in that it is an
optimization-based attack. This formulation of the loss function in CW attack can be stated as
0

0

0

f (x ) = max(max{Z(xi ) : i 6= t} − Z(xt ), −k)

(2.2)

0

Here, Z(x ) denotes the logits (the outputs of a neural network before the softmax layer) when
0

passing adversarial input (x ) and t represents the target misclassification label (the label that
want the adversary to be misclassified as), while k is a constant that controls the desired
confidence score . The intuition for this objective function is to optimize for the distance between
the target class t and the most-likely class. If t currently has the highest logit value, then the
difference of the logits will be negative, and so the optimization will stop when the logit
difference between t and the runner-up class is at most k. In other words, k controls the desired
confidence for the adversarial example (e.g. when k is small, the adversarial example generated
will be a low confidence adversarial example). On the other hand, if t does not have the highest
logit, then minimizing f brings the gap between the highest class’ logit and the target class’ logit
closer together.In figure 2.18 some examples of CW attack presented.
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Score Based attack
Score based attack like One-pixel attack works by changing only one pixel in a image[186]. Other
usual adversarial images are constructed by perturbing all pixels with an overall constraint on the
strength of accumulated modification which they tried to make smaller as possible. But in One
pixel or few pixel attack attacker tried to change as much as possible to convert the images to an
adversarial image. Here differential evolution (DE) is used, which is a population based
optimization algorithm for solving complex multi-modal optimization problems . At first ,
Encode the perturbation into an array which is optimized (evolved) by differential evolution. One
candidate solution contains a fixed number of perturbations and each perturbation is a tuple
holding five elements: x-y coordinates and RGB value of the perturbation. One perturbation
modifies one pixel. The initial number of candidate solutions (population) is 400 and at each
iteration another 400 candidate solutions (children) will be produced by using the usual DE
formula:
xi (g + 1) = xr1 (g) + F (xr2 (g) − xr3 (g))

(2.3)

here, r1 6= r2 6= r3, where xi is an element of the candidate solution, r1, r2, r3 are random
numbers, F is the scale parameter set to be 0.5, g is the current index of generation. Once
generated, each candidate solution compete with their corresponding parents according to the
index of the population and the winner survive for next iteration. Here fitness function is simply
the probabilistic label of the target class .
Decision Based Attack
Boundary attack is one of the decsion based adversarial attack, it initialized from a point that is
already adversarial and then performs a random walk between the adversarial and non-adversarial
region in a way that it fill up below criteria,
• (1) It stays in the adversarial region.
• (1) Distance between two image is reduced [20].
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Figure 2.19: Boundary Based Attack
In figure 2.19, it is illustrated how a targeted boundary attack generate an adversarial example
only by keep adding noise ’n’ sampled from some predefined noise to a benign example until the
image looks like another image from a different class, while still be classified as the true class of
the original image.
Other notable attacks
Universal Perturbation (UP) is a universal image-agnostic perturbation attack method that fools
classifiers by single adversarial perturbation to all images.[144]. Feature Adversary (FA) method
minimizes the distance of the representation of internal neural network layers instead of the output
layer to produce AA[168]. Hot/Cold method (H/C) method finds multiple AA for every single
image input. It first aligns the modified image with the original image (cold) and then measure the
similarity between the perturbed image (hot)[186].Targeted Audio Adversarial Examples (TAAE)
is an iterative optimization-based targeted attack to a state-of-the-art speech-to-text transcription
neural network via optimization based on the MFC pre-processing transformation[29].Zeroth
Order Optimization (ZOO) another attack that does not require gradients and utilizes hinge like
loss function and symmetric difference quotient to generate AA[37]. Natural GAN (NGAN)
utilizes generative adversarial networks (GANs) that minimizes the distance of the inner
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representations to generate AAs.[231] . Genetic Attack (GA)exploits population-based gradient
free optimization via genetic algorithms to replace words with their synonyms so as to generate
semantically and syntactically similar AAs[8] . Improved Genetic Algorithm (IGA) procedure
adopts the genetic metaheuristic for synonyms substitution to attain AAs[205]. Replacement,
Insertion and Removal of Words (RI and RoW) is an iterative method that combines three
different kinds of modifications to alter a regular input into an AA by replacement, insertion and
removal of words into the text[113]. Real-World Noise (RWN) technique adds real-world
scenario noises such as café, meeting, and station to generate AAs[113]. Genetic Algorithms and
Gradient Estimation (GA and GE)combines genetic algorithms and gradient estimation to
construct AAs. The attack is first carried out by gradient-free genetic algorithms, then gradient
estimation is utilized to determine careful noise placement[192].

2.2.2

Defense Against Adversarial Attacks

There are mainly two kinds of way when making defence against adversarial samples, one is
Proactive and another is Reactive. Reactive is detecting the adversarial example before it enter in
ML models, another is make ML model better so it can identify the right class of the adversarial
sample from targeted class[197].
Defense techniques against adversarial methods can be summarized in three types
• Denoising strategy or Gradient masking : Try to remove the distortions of the image.
• Basic adversarial training : Train the neural network with adversarial example
• Ensembling methods : Add multiple neural network with transformed dataset to combine a
majority result
Prepare training data for a machine learning model need to done using careful consideration and
examined process. As the accuracy of machine learning models depends much on the quality of
training data, It is must to train the machine learning models with filtered data. There were many
processes invented by the researcher to filter out training data before train the models. Wilson is
26

Defense Method

Training

Distillation

Pre-Processing

Structure modify

Network verify

Ensembling

Detection

Approach/Scheme
Ensemble Adversarial Training, a training methodology that incorporates perturbed
inputs transferred from other pre-trained models [196]
Extended adversarial and virtual adversarial training as a means of regularizing a
text classifier by stabilizing the classification function [138]
Training the state-of-the-art speech emotion recognition on the mixture of clean and
adversarial examples to help regularization [29]
The main idea used is training the model twice, initially using the one-hot ground
truth labels but ultimately using the initial model’s probability as outputs to enhance
robustness [152][180]
Using PCA, low-pass filtering, JPEG compression, soft thresholding techniques as
pre-processing technique to improve robustness [176]
Use of use two randomisation operations: (1) random resizing of input images and
(2) random padding with zeros around the input images [214]
Synonyms encoding method that inserts an encoder before the input layer of the model
and then trains the model to eliminate adversarial perturbations [205]
An architecture using Bayesian classifiers (Gaussian processes with RBF kernels) to
build more robust neural networks [18]
A verification algorithm for DNNs with ReLU function was proposed in [100]
verified the neural networks utilizing Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver
The method in [100] was modified in max(x, y) = ReLU (x − y) + y and
||x|| = ReLu(2x) − x to reduce the computational time
The proposed strategy used an ensemble of classifiers with weighted/unweighted
average of their prediction to increase robustness against attacks [185]
A probabilistic ensemble framework against adversarial examples that capitalizes
on intrinsic depth properties (e.g., probability divergence) of DNNs [1]
First, the features are squeezed either by decreasing each pixel’s color bit depth or
smoothing the sample using a spatial filter. Then, a binary classifier that uses as
features the predictions of a target model before and after squeezing of the input
sample [215]
A framework that utilizes ten nonintrusive image quality features to distinguish
between legitimate and AA samples [5]
Multiversion Programming based an audio AE detection approach, which utilizes
multiple off-the-shelf Automatic Speech Recognition systems to determine
whether an audio input is an AE [221]

Table 2.2: Summary of countermeasures against adversarial examples[47].
first researcher, who in 1972 tried to add K-NN filtering for training data for use in neural
network training [207]. Later in 1976, Tomek [206], improved Wilson’s work when he able to
correlate K with neural network efficiency. Until 2000, most of the filter research work is to prune
the data or detect the noise. Some notable works come from Hansen and Salamon [79] in 1990
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when they used an ensemble classier which detects mislabeled instances by constructing a set of
base-level detectors (classifiers) and then using their classification errors to identify mislabeled
examples. Next year, Aha, Kibler, and Albert [166] looked at the training data and tried to
identify dominant instances to rule out noisy data. In 1992, Srinibason, Muggleton, bain tried an
information theocratic approach to differentiate noise and exception [183]. Next few years some
more technique developed by researchers, Zaho and Nishida used fuzzy logic in 1995 [227], same
year Dietterich and bakiri [52] [53] developed a method for learning classifiers for multiple
classes in which error-correcting output codes are employed as a distributed output
representation. Another notable is in 1996, Gamberger, lavarc, Dzeroski tried to detect
inconsistent example in training data using a user set threshold [61]. In 1999 Brodley and Friedl
able to Combine filtering and voting approach which provides excellent results [23].
In 2005, A Angelova, Y Abu-Mostafam used Pruning Training Sets for Learning of Object
Categories they applied to bootstrap and Naïve Bayes algorithm [9]. Michael Brückner and Tobias
Scheffer use of game theory in 2011 also shows a diverse approach in developing input filters
[25]. In 2015, Ian J Goodfellow tried to training on adversarial inputs pro-actively [65], Nicolas
Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram Swami performed defensive
distillation [151] and T. Miyato, S.-i. Maeda, M. Koyama, K. Nakae, and S. Ishii training the
network with enhanced training data all to create a protection against adversarial example[139].
In 2017, Grosse et el. did statistical tests using a complementary approach to identify
specific inputs, that are adversarial [68]. Wong et el. showed convex outer adversarial polytope
can be a proven defense [211]. Lu et el. (2017) checked whether the depth map is consistent or
not (only for image) to detect adversarial examples [129]. Metzen et el. implemented deep neural
networks with a small “detector” sub-network were trained on the binary classification task of
distinguishing factual data from data containing adversarial perturbations [137]. The same year,
Madry et el. (2017) published a paper on adversarial robustness of neural networks through the
lens of robust optimization [132]. Chen et al. tried to devise adversarial examples with another
guardian neural net distillation as a defense from adversarial attacks[36]. In 2018, Wu et al.
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developed Highly Confident Near Neighbor (HCNN), a framework that combines confidence
information and nearest neighbor search, to reinforce adversarial robustness of a base
model[212]. Also in 2018, Paudice et al. applied Anamoly Detection[155] and Zhang et al.
detected adversarial examples by identifying significant pixels for prediction which only work for
images [224]. Other researchers such as Wang et al. tried with mutation testing [204] and Zhao et
al. developed key-based network, a new detection-based defense mechanism to distinguish
adversarial examples from normal ones based on error correcting output codes, using the binary
code vectors produced by multiple binary classifiers applied to randomly chosen label-sets as
signatures to match standard images and reject adversarial examples [226]. Later that year Liu et
al. tried to use steganalysis[124] and Katzir et al. implemented a filter by constructing euclidean
spaces out of the activation values of each of the deep neural network layers with k-nearest
neighbor classifiers (k-NN) [101]. A different notable strategy was taken by researchers Pang et
al. They used thresholding approach as the detector to filter out adversarial examples for reliable
predictions[150]. For an image classification problem, Tian et al. did image transformation
operations such as rotation and shifting to detect adversarial examples[194] and Xu et al.[215]
simply reduced the feature space to protect against adversary. In 2019, Monteiro et al [141]
developed inputfiler which is based on Bi-model Decision Mismatch of image. Sumanth
Dathathri showed whether prediction behavior is consistent with a set of fingerprints (a data set of
NN) named NFP method [51]. Same year, Crecchi et al. used non-linear dimensionality reduction
and density estimation techniques [44] and Aigrain et al. tried to use confidence value in CNN[4].
Some other notable works in that year were meta-learning based robust detection method to
detect new adversarial attacks with limited examples developed by Ma et al. [131]. Another
important and effective work was done by Chen et al., where they tried to keep the records of
query and used KNN to co-relate that with adversarial examples [38] In some adversarial defense
techniques well-known robust recognition models are trained on adversarial inputs proactively
[65], performing defensive distillation [151], training the network with enhanced training data all
to create a protection against adversarial example [139].To detect adversarial inputs Image
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histogram-based [158] methods are also used. In 2018 Akhter et el [6] proposed an adversarial
attack detection scheme based on image quality related features to detect various adversarial
attacks. In 2017, Carlini et al. [28] tested ten defense techniques, by detailed evaluation they
showed that pre-processing techniques can be easily bypassed.

2.3
2.3.1

Preliminaries
Metrics

Signal to Noise (SNR)
SNR is frequently defined as the ratio of the signal power and the noise power [217]. For an
image calculate the φsignal as the mean of pixel values. calculate the φnoise and the standard
deviation or error value of the pixel values. from these derive the below equation for SNR.

SN R = 10log10(φsignal /φnoise )

(2.4)

to express the result in decibel.
Peak Signal Noise Ratio(PSNR) and Root Mean Sqaure Error (RMSE)
Given a noise-free m × nmonochrome image I and its noisy approximation K Mean squared
error(MSE) is defined as:

M SE =

So RM SE =

√

m−1 n−1
1 XX
[I(i, j) − K(i, j)]2
m n i=0 j=0

(2.5)

M SE And PSNR is

P SN R = 20 · log10 (MAX I ) − 10 · log10 (MSE )
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(2.6)

Here, M AXI is the maximum possible pixel value of the image. When the pixels are represented
using 8 bits per sample, this is 255. More generally, when samples are represented using linear
Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
It calculate for difference between two images with same size. For image X and Y all pixel,
Equation is
Pn

i=1

MAE =

y i − xi
n

(2.7)

Histogram
Histogram represents the distribution of each color in the image [96][34]. Histogram doesn’t
concern about shape, size or any attribute rather than color distribution of an image. Calculation
of histogram has color range from x axis and y axis has the number of pixel with that color. For a
grayscale image I with intensity values in the range I(u, v) ∈ [0, K − 1] holds exactly K entries,
where K = 28 = 256 for a typical 8-bit grayscale image. Each single histogram entry is defined
as
h(i) =the number of pixels in I with the intensity value i,
for all 0 ≤ i < K. More formally stated,

h(i) = card(u, v)|I(u, v) = i[26]

(2.8)

Therefore, h(0) is the number of pixels with the value 0, h(1) the number of pixels with the value
1, and so forth. Finally, h(255) is the number of all white pixels with the maximum intensity value
255 = K-1. The result of the histogram computation is a 1D vector h of length K.
Local Binary patter(LBP)
Local binary patterns (LBP) is a type of visual descriptor[70]. LBP Pu2 The subscript represents
using the operator in a (P, R) neighborhood. u2 stands for using only uniform patterns and
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Figure 2.20: Adaptive filtering
labeling all remaining patterns with a single label. After the LBP labeled image f l(x, y) has been
obtained, the LBP histogram can be defined as

Hi =

X

I {fl (x, y) = i} , i = 0, . . . , n − 1,

(2.9)

x,y

in which n is the number of different labels produced by the LBP operator, and IA is 1 if A is true
and 0 if A is false.

2.3.2

Filter Techniques

Smoothing
Smoothing is an Edge Detection Technique Using the Facet Model and Parameterized Relaxation
Labeling [233]. Figure 2.20 shows an implementation of adaptive smoothing filtering. The filter
is aimed to perform image smoothing, but keeping sharp edges. This makes it applicable to
additive noise removal and smoothing objects’ interiors, but not applicable for spikes (salt and
pepper noise) removal.
suppose a (2n + 1)(2n + 1) (where n is an integer) matrix, pixel point represent by i,j the
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mean color represent by c(i,J). so sliding window can be estimated as:
j+n
i+n X
X
1
c(i, j) =
c(k, l)
2n + 12 k=i−n l=j−n

(2.10)

j
i+n X
X
1
c(i, j) =
c(k, l)
2n + 1n + 1 k=i−n l=i−j

(2.11)

j+n
i+n X
X
1
c(k, l)
c(i, j) =
2n + 1n + 1 k=i−n l=j

(2.12)

j+n
i
X
X
1
c(k, l)
c(i, j) =
2n + 1n + 1 k=i−n l=j−n

(2.13)

for left

for right

for up

for down
c(i, j) =

j+n
i+n X
X
1
c(k, l)
2n + 1n + 1 k=i l=j−n

(2.14)

The next calculations are done for each pixel:
weights are calculate for 9 pixels - pixel itself and 8 neighbors:
(Gx2 + Gy 2 )
w(x, y) = 1 − exp(
)
(2 × f actor2 )

(2.15)

Gx(x, y) =

(I(x + 1, y) − I(x − 1, y))
2

(2.16)

Gy(x, y) =

(I(x, y + 1) − I(x, y − 1))
2

(2.17)

, where factor is a configurable value determining smoothing’s quality. sum of 9 weights is
calclated (weightTotal);
sum of 9 weighted pixel values is calculatd (total);
destination pixel is calculated as

total
weight

Total.
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Figure 2.21: Additive Noise

Noise Adding filters
Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is a basic noise model used in Information theory to
mimic the effect of many random processes that occur in nature [103].
More precisely, for an image adaptive noise add the extra pixel value in the position based
on the neighbor hood pixel distribution. So for a image matrix like a =



0 1 1 0 0 0 1


0 1 1 0 0 0 1




0 0 0 0 0 0 1
after added noise image matrix will be



0 1 1 0 0 0 1


0 1 1 0 1 0 1




0 0 1 0 0 0 1
In additive noise filter, added random noise in the image as an example in figure 2.21
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Thinning (TN)
"Thinning is a morphological operation that is used to remove selected foreground pixels from
binary images, somewhat like erosion or opening. It can be used for several applications, but is
particularly useful for skeletonization[201]. In this mode it is commonly used to tidy up the
output of edge detectors by reducing all lines to single pixel thickness. Thinning is normally only
applied to binary images, and produces another binary image as output."
Let E = Z 2 E = Z 2 ,
and consider the eight composite structuring elements, composed by:
C1 = {(0, 0), (−1, −1), (0, −1), (1, −1)}
D1 = {(−1, 1), (0, 1), (1, 1)}
C2 = {(−1, 0), (0, 0), (−1, −1), (0, −1)}and
D2 = {(0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 0)}
and the three rotations of each by90o 90o , 180o 180o , and 270o 270o .The corresponding
composite structuring elements are denoted B1 , . . . , B8 B1 , . . . , B8 .
For any i between 1 and 8, and any binary image X, define
X ⊗ Bi = X \ (X

Bi )X ⊗ Bi = X \ (X

Bi ),

where \ \ denotestheset − theoreticaldif f erenceand

denotes the hit-or-miss

transform.
The thinning of an image A is obtained by cyclically iterating until convergence:
A ⊗ B1 ⊗ B2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ B8 ⊗ B1 ⊗ B2 ⊗ . . .A ⊗ B1 ⊗ B2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ B8 ⊗ B1 ⊗ B2 ⊗ . . ..
Sharpening
Sharpening is to enhance line structures or other details in an image[201]. here, Enhanced image
= original image + scaled version of the line structures and edges in the image. Line structures
and edges can be obtained by applying a difference operator (=high pass filter) on the image.
Combined operation is still a weighted averaging operation, but some weights can be negative,
and the sum=1. In frequency domain, the filter has the “high-emphasis” character.
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Gaussian blur (GS)
Gaussian blur or Gaussian smoothing is technique to reduce the image quality. In reduced image
quality the noise also get reduced much more than non-noise pixels. Convolving image with
Gaussian function is way to perform this operation. Gaussian blur known as low pass filter as it
reduce the images higher frequency components[203]. The Gaussian normal distribution equation
for two dimension is
2
1
2
P (x) = √ e−(x−µ) /2σ
σ 2π

(2.18)

Acronym

FullMeaning

Acronym

BS

Bilateral smoothing

BPDA

AS

Adaptive Smoothing

PGD

AN

Additive Noise

BIM

FGSM

First Gradient Sign
Method

MBIM

JSMA

Jacob Saliency Map
Method

SIPTS

DF

Deep Fool method

DI

HSJ

HopSkipJump
Machine Learning
Model
Image Processing
Techniques
Image Processing
Technique Sequence
Pixellate

ED

Full Meaning
BackPass Differential
Approximation
Projected Gradient
disent
Basic Iterative
method
Momentum Basic
Iterative Method
Set of Image
Processing Technique
Sequence
Pixel Difference
between before and
after IPTS applied
Euclidean distance

LBP

Local binary pattern

PDE

Probability Density
Equation

TN

Thining

GS

Grey-scaled

MLM
IPT
IPTS
PX

Table 2.3: Acronym used in this proposal
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Wavelet Transform
Wavelets are data series which starts at 0 , increases and decrease to 0 again. This Data series can
be converted to square integral function. In discrete wavelet transform , wavelets are randomly
sampled[10]. For an input represented by a list of 2n numbers, the Haar wavelet transform pair up
input values, storing the difference and passing the sum. This process is repeated recursively,
n
pairing up the sums to prove the
 next scale, whichleads to 2 − 1 differences and a final sum.

1

1

If a matrix A is: H4 = 
1


0
Its Haartransform will be:
1
1
 1

 1
1
−1
1
H4 = 2 √
 2 −√2 0


√
2
0
0

1

1

1

1 −1 −1


−1 0
0


0
1 −1


1 

−1 


0 

√ 
− 2

Distance Transform
Transforming the pixel in the image according to perspective distances of the corresponding
objects in the image is distance transform[21]. Signed distance functions definitions:
If Ω is a subset of a metric space,
 ”X”, with metric, ”d”, then the ”signed distance


d(x, ∂Ω)
if x ∈ Ω
function”, ”f”, is defined by :f (x) =


−d(x, ∂Ω) if x ∈ Ωc
where ∂Ω denotes the boundary ofΩ. For any x ∈ X,
: d(x, ∂Ω) := inf y∈∂Ω d(x, y)
where ”inf” denotes the infimum.
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Figure 2.22: Fourier transformation effect

Fourier transformation
Fourier transformation converts any signal form to sinusoidal form [159][123] . Fourier transform
denoted as :
Z

∞

F (s) ≡

f (x) e−2πisx dx ,

(2.19)

−∞

log-polar Transform
The log-polar transform is performed by remapping points from the 2D Cartesian coordinate
system (x,y) to the 2D log-polar coordinate system (σ, θ)
q
σ = log (x − xc )2 + (y − yc )2

(2.20)

θ = a tanh 2((y − yc ), (x − xc ))

(2.21)

where σ is the logarithm of the distance of a given point, (x,y), in the image from the centre,
(xc , yc ), and θ is the angle of the line through the point and the centre[210].
Census Transform
The census transform (CT) is an image operator that associates to each pixel of a grayscale image
a binary string, encoding whether the pixel has smaller intensity than each of its neighbours, one
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Figure 2.23: Gabor transformation effect
for each bit[184].
The most common version of the census transform uses a 3x3 window, comparing each
pixel p with all its 8-connected neighbours with a function ξ defined as

ξ(p, p0 ) =




0 if p > p0

.

(2.22)



1 if p ≤ p0
The results of these comparisons are concatenated and the value of the transform is an
8-bit value, that can be easily encoded in a byte.








124 74 32
1 1 0 




124 64 18 −→ 1 x 0 −→ 11010111








157 116 84
1 1 1
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(2.23)

Gabor/Morlet wavelet transform
Gabor weblet is a wavelet composed of a complex exponential (carrier) multiplied by a Gaussian
window[179]. Its equation
1

1 2

Ψσ (t) = cσ π − 4 e− 2 t (eiσt − κσ )
1

(2.24)

2

where κσ = e− 2 σ is defined by the admissibility criterion, and the normalisation constant
cσ is:
 1

3 2 −2
2
cσ = 1 + e−σ − 2e− 4 σ

(2.25)

The Fourier transform of the Morlet wavelet is:

Ψ̂σ (ω) = cσ π

2.3.3

− 14



− 12 (σ−ω)2

e

− 21 ω 2

− κσ e



(2.26)

Genetic Algorithm (GA)

GA is an evolutionary heuristic search algorithm. It is a population-based algorithm that helps
find the best result using biological phenomena such as reproduction, mutation, recombination,
and selection. Genetic Programming, Gene Expression Programming, and the Strength Pareto
Evolutionary Algorithm are prominent examples of GAs. Genetic programming mainly works by
encoded computer problem solutions pool known as the population to gene like structure and try
to find out the best solution by using different evolutionary techniques. At first, a set of random
solutions is generated from all possible solutions in representation space. Then an evaluation of
these solutions based on some measures is performed. Based on these measures, the best
solutions are the crossover and mutation to generate a new set of solutions. The same procedure is
iterated repeatedly until a near-optimal solution is found or the termination condition is met.
During this process, an answer with the best measures is selected as a result. The set of genes
creates individuals as their solution. The collection of individuals is known as population. When
two individuals create a new individual, it is known as a crossover operation. When a bit of an
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individual is changed, it is known as a mutation in the GA. GA has been used for Computer
Vision (regenerate images [71]), Computational AI domain (searching
recommendations[78][169],Cybersecurity Domain (smart grid management [174]),and many
other domains.

2.3.4

Negative Selection Algorithm

Immunological Computation a.k.a. Artificial Immune System (AIS) is inspired by the human
immune system (HIS) mechanism and utilizes to solve computational problems[48]. One of the
fundamental aspects of the HIS is self/non-self discrimination. The Human immune system can
identify which cells are own (self) and can differentiate foreign entities (non-self)[202].
Therefore, it can strengthen its defense versus the adversarial rather of hurting the self cell. The
most popular AIS research methods include the Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA), clonal
selection, immune network theory, danger theory, and positive selection [49]. The NSA is one of
the most studied and researched algorithms, particularly for anomaly detection[93, 72]. In 1994
[59], introduced NSA for solving computer security problems.

Figure 2.24: The basic Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) [45] similar to any two-phase supervised learning algorithms. The left diagram shows detector generation in the complementary space
(training phase) and the right illustrates the use of detectors (testing phase).
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Basic concepts of NSA
Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) uses complementary representation space of positive data
features or profile. The basic concept of NSA is illustrated in figure 2.24, where negative
detectors are generated in the complementary space. Here the positive data are the features of
training/clean/normal data which may be represented in real, binary, or strings. Given this
positive profile, an NSA can generate detectors/filters/clusters in negative or complementary
space. So, these detectors must not match any clean/self data sample, and can be used to classify
input data as adversarial or not (similar to self and non-self-discrimination). Different matching
methods were used to measure the distance between the self and non-self in binary representation
of feature space including Euclidean distance, Manhattan distance, R-bit chunk matching,
Hamming Distance, etc. Also different variants of NSA have been used many application
domains and demonstrated as advantageous in one class classification problems, outlier detection,
fault detection, intrusion/anomaly detection[3, 93], etc.
NSA Terminology
• Self: Representation of a data class. NSA will identify a given data is from self class or not.
This self data can be a set of real values or a set binary value, or a string.
• Detector: A set of data which matched with non-self data.
• Distance Measure/Matching rules: The formula/method used to measure the distance
between two data points in representation space. Commonly in the NSA, it was used to
measure the detector’s distance from a data point. It is also known as matching rules,
primarily when data is represented in string representation. Examples are Euclidean
distance, Manhattan distance, R-bit chunk matching, hamming Distance, etc.
Most of these terminology and other necessary mathematics related to distance measures have
been detailed by the [93] with a statistical explanation.
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Figure 2.25: A real-valued NSA for generating variable-size detectors (V-detector) with statistical
estimate of complementary space coverage[94]. Here N number of the detector, ’x’ is number of
positive point, ’P’ is probability and α is target coverage, n is sample size.
Based on feature value, we can have two kinds of NSA: the binary NSA (BNSA) and the
Real-Value NSA (RNSA). Real-value NSA can be variable size or constant size. The BNSA use
r-contiguous bits(rcb), r-chunks, landscape-affinity matching, Hamming distance to match the
similarity, where RNSA uses mostly derivations of Euclidean distances. One example of a
variable size detector or V-detector, V-detector’s aim, deals with constant size detectors’
drawbacks. In this algorithm, the size radius of detectors is changing from one to the others[94].
The NSA detectors can be represented by string for (binary) BNSA or by a vector in
multidimensional space for real values. Later, grid-based representations were also introduced by
Yang[218]. A variation of grid representation [232] is known as matrix representation also
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introduced as an additional approach. Detector initialization was random in most of the early
variations of NSA. Later, researchers tried some heuristic methods to use pseudo-randomness and
some evolutionary computation-based adaptiveness technique to initialize detector position.
Detector size can be fixed or can change through the generation process. Also, the different
detector can take the detector’s variable size, and these sizes can be dynamically changes
throughout the generation process.
Real-Valued NSA for generating V-detectors
One of the widely-used NSA, called variable-size detectors (V-detector) algorithm was proposed
by Ji and Dasgupta[92], which used variable-sized detector radii to cover the complementary
space. The V-detector algorithm was improved in subsequent works [95] to limit the number of
detectors and adopting boundary-aware strategy [91]. The difference between traditional
NSA[64] and V-detector NSA was in V-detector, the detector size in representation spaces are
different than each other, and they are aware of each other existence, so they don’t overlap. Figure
2.25 illustrates the NSA V-detector algorithm for generating negative detectors.

2.3.5

One class classifications (OCC)

One class classifications (OCC) solve problems where the training datasets only contain samples
of one class, and learning models have to identify new data whether belong to that class or not. it
is also known as unary classification or class-modelling problem. Most common approach for
solving one class problem is one class support vector machine (OCSVM[39]). Other similar
approaches are Minimum Co-variance Method (MCM) [85], Gaussian Mixture Model
(GMM)[165], Dirichlet Process Mixture Model (DPMM)[17], Kernel Density Estimator
(KDE)[142], Robust KDE[104]. GWR-Netwrok[133], Deep Support Vector Data Description
(SVDD), Deep Auto Encoder based Methods[84], Generative Adversarial Net Based approaches
(eg: [119, 173], etc. These OCC techniques can be classified in 6 types. Minimum Covariance
Determinant(MCD[80]), OCSVM, Deviation-based(LMDD[12]) considered as linear model
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based OCC techniques. Another type is proximity based which includes Local Outlier
Factor(LOF)[22], Connectivity-Based (COF[191]), Clustering-Based LOF(CBLOF[83]),
Histogram-based (HBOS[62]), K-Nearest Neighbors (kNN[161]), Subspace Outlier Detection(
SOD [109]).
Angle-Based (ABOD[108]) , Copula-Based (COPOD[121], Stochastic
Selection(SOS[90]) are known as probabilistic techniques used for OCC. Combining several
methods of OCC are known as ensemble techniques those include Isolation Forest (IF[195]),
Locally Selective Combination of Parallel Outlier Ensembles(LSCP [230]), Feature Bagging(FB
[114]), Extreme Boosting Based (XGBOD [228]), etc.
With the improvement of deeplearning methods, OCC problems were solved using
different neural network models such as Fully connected AutoEncoder (AE[2]), Variational
AutoEncoder(VAE[105]), Single-Objective GAN (SO-GAAL [127]), Multiple-Objective
GAN(MO-GAAL[127]), etc.
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Chapter 3
Proposed research

3.1

Goal and Objectives

Researchers have suggested several benchmarks [32, 13, 31, 28, 27, 198] and use these
benchmark to evaluate defense techniques. They also suggested guidelines on how to develop
efficient defense techniques. Most of their benchmark focused on how many attacks a defense
technique can defend. Some of them prioritized testing against adaptive attacks. As these
benchmarks were mostly dependent on dataset and attack set, how these defense techniques
compared to other techniques, such as compliance, computational cost, cybersecurity practices,
etc are mostly overlooked. Also, these evaluations did not provide a metric for measurement. I
concluded that these benchmarks are very good to evaluate defense techniques’ performances and
novelty but these benchmarks do not help a learning model developer to pick a defense technique
appropriate for specific problems. I tried to answer these limitations by My benchmarking system.
I simulated some use cases where a Machine Learning model requires a defense technique
to protect against adversarial attacks.
• First case: I considered that I will protect a Pytorch[102] Resnet model for Predicting handwriting
digit tool for android devices.
• Second case: I considered that I will protect a Pytorch Resnet model for Predicting handwriting
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tools running on an Amazon Web service[146] using the Django framework[58].
• Third case: I considered protecting a MNIST TensorFlow project using ML.NET project[117] as a
console application.
• Fourth Case: I considered that I will employ an MNIST dataset using Deeplearning4j[107] from
java library as a desktop project.
• Fifth Case: I considered protecting Close circuit camera used in a parking lot for reading car
number-plates using deep-learning.

I tried to secure the learning model for the above-mentioned cases with standard cybersecurity
practices such as keeping data privacy, secure authentication, and access policy. I considered most
of the mentioned defense techniques discussed in section ??. I observed that many defense
techniques were not suitable for some of My cases. For example, image prepossessing based
defense is not suitable for mobile apps and adversarial training reduces the accuracy for number
plate recognition. Adversarial training based defenses were not suitable if training data is
sensitive to share. GAN based defense requires high computation cost, which seems very
unreasonable for simple AI tasks where the higher error rate is tolerable. From these case studies,
I understood which defense techniques were better suited and what factors were more important
than others. I weighted them based on My observations. These factors are:
• F1:Tested against multiple data set. W = 10
• F2:Tested against black-box -white box attack. targeted-non targeted, gradient based-non gradient
based attacks W = 5
• F3: Have low computational overhead cost.W = 5
• F4: Cross-models and multi domain applicability .W = 5
• F5: Tested against adaptive attack.W = 10
• F6: No machine learning involved in the defense technique.W = 5
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• F7: Randomness exist to answer obscurity.W = 10
• F8: No training data needed.W = 10
• F9: No Knowledge of the learning model needed to know.W = 10
• F10:No modification of the learning model needed.W = 10
• F11:No accuracy drop of learning model needed.W = 10
• F12:No adversarial knowledge needed to generate defense.W = 10

F1 is very important for understanding the effectiveness of an adversarial attack. I weighted these
by 10. Number F2 is about the diverseness of attack types. I weighted this by 5. Learning models
usually have large computational complexity; thus if the protecting tool requires higher
computational overhead it will make full system impractical to use due to both time and cost. I
weighted it by 5. Some defense techniques can only work for a specific domain; for instance My
proposed methods are only for computer vision domain, and I tested on against attack samples
from Resnet and VGG-16. As adversarial samples have transfer-ability to another learning model.
It is expected that defense methods will supports cross-models and multi-domains. I weighted this
factor only by 5 as defense techniques are easily customize-able as per requirement. Defending
against an adaptive attack is very important, as the attacker can try continuously until succeeding.
So F5 is important as F2. If there is a Machine learning involved in the defense technique than
that technique can be also susceptible to adversarial attack. So involving defending Machine
learning with another machine learning will not improve security rather it creates another door
way of the same vulnerabilities. I weighted F6 as 5. I have to assume that My defense technique
details are known to the attacker. That’s why randomness is needed which will make it hard for
predict what defense configuration will be set for each attack time. I weighted this as 10. F8, F9,
F10, and F11 are related to CIA models of information security. All information security policy
measures try to address three goals known as confidentiality (protect the confidentiality of assets),
integrity(preserve the integrity of assets), and availability (promote the availability of assets for
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authorized users). These goals form the CIA model[7] which is the basis of all security
programs[172]. Here, ML is considered as a digital asset, I ensure its confidentiality as I am not
consuming or accessing any architectural information of ML. The same way integrity is preserved
as I don’t need to modify or tune anything in ML architectures. If training data or learning models
are needed to generate defense it will violate confidentiality if modification of the learning model
is needed it will violate integrity and if the accuracy drop it will violate the availability. Because
of this dilemma, I weighted F8, F9, F10, F11 by 10. Zero-day vulnerability can also be present in
adversarial defenses if there are no safeguard against unknown adversarial attack methods. There
is high probability chance of unknown attacks that’s why I give this factor 10 weight value. I
disregarded several factors such as easy maintenance or update facility, time to implement, etc, as
they also depend on the learning model itself. The total score of a defense technique can be
Defense Techniques
Adversarial Training [140] [197] [113]
Image Prepossessing [215]
Input Reconstruction[136]
Distillation Techniques [151],[180]
Transform Function [176]
Defense GAN[171]
Model Robustifying[19][185]

F1
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

F2
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

F3
5
5
5
5
5

F4
5

F5

5
5
5

10

F6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

F7

F8
10
10
10

F9
10
10
10
10
10

F10
10
10
10

F11
10
0
0

10

10

10

10

10

F12

10

F_score
0.6
0.5
0.45
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.6

Table 3.1: Here, I scored based on equation of Fscore from My study of different defense techniques. (Some of these scores are an approximation based My understanding) In the last column,
the overall score is presented. Based on the overall score I can see Some of the techniques have
better usability than others.
measured by below equation
P
Fscore =

Fi=1..12
100

(3.1)

The Maximum score is possible up to 1 and the lowest score is possible as low as 0. Based on
these factors, I create a radar map as shown in figure 3.3 with 3 defense techniques. Here, the
effectiveness represents by the factor F1 and F2. Computation feasibility represents by factor F3.
F4 represents by platform-independent. Vulnerability represents factor F5,F6,F7. These factors
cover potential vulnerability such as a zero-day attack, advanced persistent attack, and insider
attacks. F8-F12 are represented by cybersecurity Compliance. I further analyzed other defense
methods and presented their benchmark result in table 3.1. I can see that none of the defense
technique have a better score than 0.6. As the max possible score is 1, there are opportunities to
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improve.

Figure 3.1: My Proposed Bench-marking Process with sample data. Here I tried to represent some
common defense techniques in a radar map.
I aim to provide an adversarial defense system which will meet the below objectives:
• Defense needs to work against a diverse set of attack types. My provided defense technique
should work against Gradient or no-gradient, white-box or black-box, targeted or no
targeted, adaptive attacks [32].
• Defense should not reduce the accuracy of ML models. The model accuracy should not get
effected after deploying My defense technique.
• Defense needs to identify threats faster. If a defense system takes sizeable computational
time and resources, it will lose the practicability. For example, if the defense is employed in
an autonomous car sensor, the input responses need to evaluate first. Otherwise, an accident
can happen.
• Defense should not modify ML architecture. Defense should work for both the white-box
and black-box models. A trained ML architectural information is usually black-box. So, it
50

is expected that the defense framework will comply with that.
• Defense should be adaptive in nature and dynamic to prevent the adaptive attacks.
• Defense should not need to update if ML changes (Resnet to VGG or ANN to RNN), and it
should be cross-domain (image, audio, text) supported.

3.2

Basic Architecture

Figure 3.2: Schematic of the proposed Dual-Filtering (DF) framework.

To build a robust ML/AI-based system against malicious adversaries, I designed a dual-filtering
(i.e., commutative filtering) scheme, which employs two filtering mechanisms: one at the input
stage (before samples are fed to the core learning model) and other at the output of ML (before
the decision module). These two filters can function independently as well as dependently (i.e., in
a commutative fashion). Specifically, the input filter’s main aim is to filter misleading and out of
distribution inputs (e.g., image of animal but not human face in a face recognition system). The
51

output filter’s goal is handling larger variations and restricting misclassification rates in order to
improve overall accuracy of the system. The proposed dual-filtering strategy can be used both in
training and testing phases of ML. For instance, the independent input filter may be used to detect
and deter the poising attacks in a supervised ML. Likewise, dual-commutative filters may help
addressing adversaries both in supervised and unsupervised ML. A machine learning framework
usually consists of four main modules: feature extraction, feature selection (optional),
classification/clustering, and decision. As depicted in Figure 5.3, the input filters are placed after
pre-processing of data stream/feature selection to feed to core learning model and the output
filters are placed after classification/clustering/raw decision module, respectively.
As can been seen in Figure 5.3, the raw input sample is first pre-processed and then fed to
the input filter to determine if the received feature/sample is benign or attack and reject
accordingly. The outcome (i.e., raw decision) by ML system is given to the output filter for
further scrutiny. The output filter uses context-information and/or communicates with the input
filter to make the correct final decision. An ensemble of different noise removal or detection
filters was applied to detect AAs in a recent work [47]. Other techniques focused mostly on
adding extra layer on a ML module by adversarial sample training or modification of deep
learning models. These defense methods have some constraints, and exposed ML models to new
vulnerabilities [76].
In 2019, some works reported launching adaptive attacks where they could bypass known
defenses [32]. To alleviate the situation, I consider a non-deterministic (white-box) approach
where the attackers cannot perceive My defenses to launch adaptive attacks. Accordingly, I
investigated an active learning[175] based dual-validation scheme which work as an extra security
(filtering) layer and improve the learning model’s trustworthiness.
Accordingly, My defensive measures for machine learning model (MLM) have the
following tasks:
• Input filter before MLM: The primary purpose of input filters is to prevent adversarial
input data in such a way that can differentiate data manipulation from the trained data. It
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will be examining the input by deploying application-specific filter sequence. A set of filter
sequences are selected (from a given library of filters) using an efficient search and
optimization algorithm, called multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA). The MOGA can
find a sequence of filters (where each filter can detect adversarial traits/noises) satisfying
constrains and three objectives: detection of the maximum number of attacks with higher
accuracy (above a specific threshold), with minimum processing time, and shorter sequence
of ensemble filters. By utilizing the Pareto-set from MOGA runs, and picking a filter
sequence dynamically at different times, make filter selections unpredictable and use an
active learning approach in order to protect the ML from adaptive attacks.
• Output filter after MLM: Employ several class-specific latent space-based transformation
for outlier detection. After MLM provides an output class label, it is then verified if the
output falls in that class’s latent space or not. I will make an ensemble of different outlier
detection methods and sequence dynamically and also retrain the outlier methods runtime.

3.3
3.3.1

Use Standard Data sets
ML Dataset

For bench-marking, MNIST and CIFAR are mostly used by academicians over the world. There
are many other datasets for neural network experiments, and I have used the below data set
• MNIST
• CIFAR-10
• ImageNet
• SVHN
• NPD
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Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology database (MNIST)
MNIST consists of 60000 training and 10000 testing data of single digits zero to nine. These are
all black background images with written numbers in white colors. Using a linear classifier, it has
83% accuracy. But with using CNN, accuracy is above 99.6%.
Canadian Institute For Advanced Research (CIFAR)
CIFAR dataset includes 60,000 32x32 color images in 10 distinct classes (6,000 images of each
class) . These classes are planes, cars, birds, deer, dogs, frogs, horses, cats, ships, and trucks. The
regular CNN has near 80% accuracy, but ResNet has accuracy near 98%, and some efficient DNN
methods reach the accuracy of 99% [208].
ImageNet Dataset (IND)
ImageNet Dataset has more than 14million images, which have been handpicked and classified. It
has more than 20000 categories, for example, ballon, strawberry, etc. Using CNN made it
possible to achieve 85% accuracy here. Due to algorithmic bias use of ImageNet is not always
applicable as a standard dataset.
Street View House Numbers (SVHN)
SVHN is a dataset for house numbers; it has ten classes, 1 for each digit. With 73257 digits for
training, 26032 digits for testing, and 531131 additional unlabeled data. Using CNN, accuracy is
over 98%.
Number Plate Dataset (NPD)
NumberPlate Dataset [181] contains 100000 number plates from the USA and Europe. Using
CNN, the accuracy of this Dataset is above 98%
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3.3.2

Generated Adversarial Dataset

I generated 60000 adversarial images from FGSM, JSMA, and CW attacks for MNIST and
CIFAR datasets. 10000from each attack type and 1000 from each class label. This dataset is the
largest adversarial dataset on MNIST and CIFAR, as best of My knowledge from My extensive
literature survey. I published these datasets in Kaggle publicly for result reproduction and further
study by other researchers.

3.4

Threat models

Threat Model

Benchmark

ATTACK TYPE
WhiteBox
Knowledge
BlackBox
Targeted
Specificity
Non-Targeted
One time
Frequency
Iterative
Gradient based
Methodology
Gradient free
Adaptive
MNIST
Dataset
CIFAR
IMAGENET
ResNet
ML Model
Simple CNN
VGG

JSMA
*

FGSM
*

DF
*

BPDA

*
*

*

*
*

HSJ

*
*

*

*

*
*
*

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

Table 3.2: Summary of Threat Models and associated manipulation strategies and dataset used for
experimentation.

3.4.1

Attack types

Yuan et al. (2018)[220] suggested making threat models consist of Adversarial Falsification
(False negative, False Positive), white-box, BlackBox, targeted, non- targeted, onetime and
iterative attacks. Carlini et al.[32], suggested that adversarial attack and defense models need to
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be tested against a diverse set of attacks. Also, they need to be evaluated against adaptive attacks.
Moreover, Tramer et al. [198] suggested different themes to evaluate a defense model. Keeping
these guidelines in mind, I developed My threat model inclusive of basic, advanced attack and
adaptive attack (against My defenses) types. Carlini et al. [28] also recommended using at least
one gradient-free and one hard-label attack. To address that concern, I evaluated My proposed
method with gradient-free attacks such as local search attack [145] and hop-skip-jump attack [35].
For testing against an adaptive attack, I used BPDA (Backward Pass Differential Approximation
[14]), which can be used to attack non-differential prepossessing-based defenses. Uesato el
al.[199] advised to consider obscurity of adversarial attack when considering the defenses. [32]
pointed out that testing a defense in one dataset is not enough, therefore I chose multiple datasets
(i.e., MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet). I considered a standard distortion  = 0.3 for MNIST
and  = 8/255 for CIFAR-10, as current state-of-the-art [198] recommended. Thus, My threat
model is a combination of gradient-based, gradient-free, and adaptive evasion based adversarial
attacks on multiple datasets. These attacks studied in this work are a combination of White-box,
Black-Box, targeted and non-targeted attacks. Also, the presented defense will be able to defend
against attacks that are completely unknown to the proposed defense scheme.
Table 3.2 summaries the threat models I investigated in My work. Here the second column
shows different strategies used in threat models, the third column mentions usability tactics and
the rest of the columns provide specific image manipulation techniques.

3.4.2

Attack Samples generation

My attack samples are PGD, BIM, MBIM, FGSM, JSMA, DF, HopSkipJump, Localsearch, and
CW methods. I generated a minimum of 1000 adversarial samples from each attack type to ran
My experiments. I find out a sequence of blur+AS+pixellete works for PGD, BIM, FGSM,
MBIM, which I used as a defended model in BPDA adaptive attack and generated new attack
samples. I generated FGSM, JSMA, CW, and DF using Pytorch [63]. I used BIM, MBIM, PGD,
local Search attack, and HopSkipJump using IBM-ART-Toolbox[149] and Cleverhans adversarial
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library[153]. I used modified advertorch[54] to generate BPDA attack samples. I noticed that the
destruction rate (i.e., the rate of failure of adversarial attack when it is converted to visual form)
[112] is higher in advanced attack types. I disregarded those images from attack samples. Also,
due to My restriction of  = 8/255 for CIFAR-10 as maximum noise value, I had to discard some
samples from My dataset. I also experimented with three types of adversarial patch’s on
ImageNet dataset. I used 10-20 adversarial patches for My experiment using different adversarial
patch attack like DPATCH [125], LAVAN[99].

3.5

Preliminary Experiments

Types

Normal

Dpatch [125]
Lavan [99]
Patch [24]
FGSM[65]
BIM [132]
JSMA [209]
CW [30]
DF [143]

10
15
18
43
32
28
61
85

2x
0
0
3
20
28
22
55
90

Resize
0.5x
5
5
6
18
16
10
75
95

4x
0
0
3
20
28
22
55
90

5’
0
0
0
0
5
0
60
72

Rotate
15’ 45’
5
5
5
5
6
6
10 15
12 18
10 25
75 90
90 95

15x
35
35
55
60
66
60
100
100

Motion
20x 50x
35
80
35
85
60
70
77
85
76
86
75
85
100 100
100 100

Illumination
5 15 25
0
0
5
0
0
5
0
0
5
5 10 12
10 15 20
15 25 30
70 80 100
85 90 100

Table 3.3: Destruction rates of various attack types under different environmental conditions. The
values in column “Normal” indicate destruction rates under raw image and following columns
represent where the successful attack types in normal conditions are experimented with other conditions. In resize, I re-scaled the image and turn backward to original sizes. To simulate motion
effect I used Gaussian blur with different sigma value. For illumination effect I increased the
brightness. I can see the destruction rates gets higher when rotate and motions are higher. Adversarial patch’es have lower destruction rate.

3.5.1

Applicability issue of Adversarial Attacks

To explain the applicability issues of adversarial attacks, I need first to understand the detection
and destruction rate of adversarial attacks.
• Detection Rate: Adversarial attack is possible to distinguish from the non-adversarial
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samples by different detection methods. Different techniques have different efficiency to
detect the adversarial samples. This efficiency to detect adversarial samples or adversarial
image (AI) can be measured by the detection rate. In short, My detection rate can simply
put as:
P
DetectionRate =

AIdetected +
P

P

P
N onAI − F alsedetected
P
%
AI + N onAI

(3.2)

• Destruction Rate: Most of the adversarial attack studies ignore the destruction rate, but I
prioritize the destruction rate to evaluate practicability. There could be many reasons that an
adversarial attack sample fails to perform as adversarial samples. The rate of this failure
can be represented by the destruction rate. Kurakin and Yan Goodfellow [112] provided an
equation when adversarial images failed to identified as successful adversarial attack after
they converted to PNG or printed on a paper. I used the same equation to provide
destruction rates of attack samples. In short, My destruction rate can simply put as:
P
DestructionRate =

F ailedAdversarialImages
P
%
AdversarialImages

(3.3)

Kurakin[112] represented destruction rate phenomena by the following equation
Pn
d=

k , yk
k
k
k
k
T rue )C(Xadv , y T rue )C(T (Xadv ), y T rue )
Pn
k
k k
k
k=1 C(X , y T rue )C(Xadv , y T rue )

k=1 C(X

(3.4)

Here, destruction rate is the fraction of adversarial images which are no longer
misclassified in real world scenario.
It is well observed, the adversarial images generated do not remain as adversarial when
converted to the visual format of images such as ’PNG’. Deep learning models typically use
floating values instead of using integer values which are present in image RGB format. This is
because it helps better convergence. Real numbers have infinite range and depend on the
precision, where as integers have finite range. The activation functions perform better in achieving
global optima, like sigmoid activation/Tanh works better with floating values. If I use integer
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values there is a chance I will miss many local optima and there is a chance I never get a global
optimum. Common hardware is equipped to run deep learning with floating-point values. This
tendency of preferring floating conversion from integer values of RGB creates the practicability
problem for adversarial images. Due to the conversion of float to integer, added noise/perturb
disappears. In the paper, Kevin Eykholt et al.[56] reported that the effect of adversarial example
get minimized due to several factors in real world scenario. They are environmental conditions,
spatial constraints, physical limits on imperceptibility and fabrication Error. They provided a
sticker based adversarial attack which works in real world from different angle and distances.
However, this attack seems easily identifiable by the human eye due to the shape and intensity of
embedded noise. Sharif et al.[177] used adversarial perturbations on the lens of eyeglasses to
attack the face recognition system. However, such attack didn’t mention destruction rates of
adversarial perturbation also their experiment was in a constrained environment. In 2019, Zeng et
al.[222] added perturb in 3D models instead of 2D images and showing successful adversarial
attacks but there was also no discussion about destruction rate, which makes it difficult to
reproduce with the same accuracy. In 2017, Kurakin et al.[112], showed that in the digital version
and printed version destruction rate exist, and for advanced attack methods the destruction rate
gets higher. They tried to justify their argument with FGSM, BIM, and least likely iterative
methods. Lu et al.[130] in their paper experimented with FGSM, BIM, and LBFGS methods and
showed the destruction rate can be achieved up of 100% based on distances that invalidating these
attacks. Pierazzi et al.[157] shows that, "it is feasible to create adversarial examples in the
problem space (realizable attacks) and that it seems there is no correlation between the ability of
the classifier to detect such attacks and the disruption of the adversarial examples”. However, the
problem with Pierazzi et al.[157]. works is that they restricted the problem space which are not
applicable for real situation when other environmental factors are present.


As an example, an image of class label ’A’, pixel values are 127 243 47 will divided


by 255(8bit range) and converted to 0.4980392157 0.9529411765 0.1843137255
.T heperturbs are
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Dataset ->
Attack types
FGSM [65]
BIM [132]
MBIM [55]
JSMA [209]
CW [30]
Deepfool [143]
HSJ [35]

Destruction Rate
MNIST
Digital
Print
43
22
32
26
46
15
28
31
61
25
85
22
45
23

CIFAR
Digital
53
68
76
92
96
-

Print
24
26
31
32
32
-

Destruction Rate(with threshold)
MNIST
CIFAR
Digital
Print
Digital
2
33
6
1
21
4
2
12
2
22
11
12
29
17
15
14
32
5
12
-

Print
24
26
21
27
30
-

Destruction Rate(threshold+30)%
MNIST
CIFAR
Digital
Print
Digital
Print
1
23
3
24
1
26
4
26
1
15
1
31
10
8
25
26
10
16
28
4
15
-

Table 3.4: In first four columns under the Destruction rate without threshold, I show percentages
of adversarial samples failed to remain as adversarial. Next four columns show the adversarial
rate among the adversarial samples which satisfied My threshold value. In the last four columns I
provided the adversarial samples destruction rate when threshold value increases 30% more.




0.00000000007 −0.00000000004 0.000000000089 , which makes the image values

as 0.4980392164 0.9529411761 0.1843137268 .


Now it is an adversarial image that will classify as label B. But when I convert it by


multiplying 255 will return the 127 243 47 which has class label A. This adversarial
operation does not exist in real world due to noise value being too small. As all adversarial attack
types aim to reduce the epsilon value the practicability issue rises more in advanced attack types.
I proposed a method of minimum threshold of perturbing value which guarantees that
noises will affect when the adversarial sample is converted to any image format. However, it does
not differentiate whether the perturbed image will be an adversarial or not, it assures that this
noise will affect when the image will be an input for an ML model. I tested, attack samples with
minimum threshold value’s. I determined the destruction rate and compare the result with attacks
sample’s conventional destruction rates. Assuming, vector spaces of pixel values are converted
between 0 to 1. If the standard floor and the ceil math function are used to reconvert vector values
to the image, I can have the below formulation for the single color channel.
Let, a pixel non floating value X for a single color channel.
Image each channel are N bit. Thus perturb value  need to bigger than a threshold value,
which can be derived from below equation.

(

2N

x
+ ) × (2N − 1) ≥ x + 0.5
−1
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(3.5)

From Equation 3.5, I get
≥

0.5
2N − 1

For, 8 bit single channel color, the minimum threshold value will be T ≈

(3.6)
0.5
28 −1

≈ 0.00196078431

From printed version if an average accuracy drop is δ, for a printed version the threshold
needs to increase by
Tp ≈  +

×δ
100

(3.7)

As an example, I observed 20% drop of FGSM method for 8bit MNIST grey channel adversarial,
So here the minimum threshold should be
Tp ≈ 0.00196078431 + 0.00039215686 ≈ 0.00235294117 Any noise  need to be greater than T
to have a chance of becoming a digital adversarial image and be greater than Tp to have any
chance in becoming a printed adversarial image.
I experimented with basic attack types such as FGSM, JSMA also as and advanced attack
types such as CW, Deepfool, etc and used MNIST, CIFAR, and ImageNet data sets. At first I
converted all adversarial samples to PNG and observed destruction rates. The successful attack
PNG’s are printed and scanned as PNG again (similar as [112]. Then I cropped and resized them
as original training samples and tried again with the ML model again, I calculating which images
were correctly classified as an adversarial attack. Using equation 3.5, I calculated the destruction
rates under different environment constraints(example: Rotate, Resize, Illumination, Motion). I
simulated motion by blurring the image and I increased the brightness for illumination effect. The
results are presented in table 3.3. Here for adversarial patch attack, I used ImageNet and for other
attacks, I used average destruction rate of CIFAR and MNIST combination. In the 6th row,
FGSM has a 43% destruction rate when it converted to image format. The remaining images have
a destruction rate of 10% when their brightness increased 15%. This table shows that Adversarial
patch-based attacks have higher tolerance and CW, Deepfool has lower tolerance from the
environmental factor.
I used equation 3.5 with δ value 20% and considered image’s with at least 70% of noise
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above the calculated threshold. I converted the images in PNG and measured the destruction
rates. After that, I printed the successful PNG to print and measure the destruction rates. The
experimented results are shown in table 3.4. I used an image difference (Pixel value difference)
technique to calculate the δ value as Gupta et al.[77] shows in their paper.
From table 3.3, I can see motion and rotation has more effects. I observed that CW and
Deep-Fool attacks had a 100% destruction rate if they rotated too much. It is also observable that
patch-based attacks have good performance in real world conditions. These results proved that if I
use some reflecting technique I can avoid advanced perturb based attacks.
From table 3.4, I can see that when only considering adversarial images with noise above
My threshold, the drop of accuracy sharply declines from the previous result in the table3.3 where
all the adversarial samples destruction rate were shown. From the table, it appears destruction in
the printed version does not change much based on the attack type. Destruction rate is pretty
consistent with any normal clean image detection failure rate, as well,

3.5.2

Adversarial Input detection

I applied 4 transformation techniques such as Fourier transform [219], Census Transform[60],
Gabor Transform[182] and Wavelet Transform[156] on adversarial images and also applied them
on clean data set. I calculated average SNR value from all clean images and use that as threshold
value. I observed SNR values are higher in adversarial images and using that threshold value I
can detect basic adversarial attacks. In the image, SNR values are calculated by using the mean of
pixels as a signal (S) and std deviations of pixels as noise (N) with below equation

SN R = 10 × log10

S
N

(3.8)

I presented these results in table 3.5 for MNIST data-set. I not conducted detection experiment for
adversarial patch attacks but as they are visible to human eye and the experiments of researcher
Chiang et al.[42] shows that adversarial patch attacks are also detectable, I set the detection rate
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FGSM
BIM
JSMA
HSJ
CW
DEEPFOOL

Detection accuracy rate by SNR
value using simple transformation
Fourier Census Wavelet Gabor
89
99
99
70
85
80
95
65
75
70
85
55
55
55
65
0
30
10
15
0
15
15
15
0

Table 3.5: Using four common transformation technique to distinguish between adversarial samples and common samples (From MNIST). I used 20000 clean images avg Signal to noise ratio(SNR) as threshold. Attack images which have higher SNR than the threshold are identified
as adversarial images . Here I provided the detection rates. I can observe that CW and Deepfool
Detecting is harder.
higher as FGSM.
when I observed the detection rates of different attacks in table 3.5. Here in the1st row, if
FGSM samples transformed using Fourier transform and calculate its SNR value that 89% of
FGSM images are outside of Clean images SNR value range. I can see the CW, Deep-Fool
attacks are hard to detect from SNR values. From the results of the above experiments I draw the
graph in figure 6.1. Here, In the graph, I can see the destruction rate and detection rate are
co-related each other. Based on these rates I calculated feasibility scores of different attack types
for MNIST dataset.

3.5.3

Identifying Vulnerability

Based on our previous discussion, we can see evasion-based adversarial attacks are difficult to
formulate in the real world. Environmental factors can easily cancel out adversarial noises. The
noises which are not canceled out are also very easily detected by common filters. Most of the
defense technique has 99% accuracy rate of adversarial detection for high noise adversarial
attacks ( example: FGSM, JSMA, BIM). So, this question can simply arise that do we need to
care about adversarial attacks?
To answer this question, let’s observe where an adversarial attack can be formulated. In
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Figure 3.3: Generalized adversarial attack points on ML model
the figure 3.3, we illustrated general points where adversarial manipulation could happen on a
system where an ML service is deployed. We will consider the ML model as a black box. We
marked the attack points by number.
First, when the input is on the physical world, an adversary can change the input as a
famous adversarial example of changing stop sign to speed limit sign conversion. Here, we have
to note that this attack needs a higher physical degree of modification. Hence, if the noise amount
is low, there is a high chance that environmental factors will nullify the attacks based on our
literature review.
The second point is primarily I/O layers. For example, if someone changes one of the
sensors so that sensors can add adversarial noises while converting physical input data into a
digital form. One prominent example is putting an adversarial patch sticker on the CC cam lens to
manipulate ML output[li2019adversarial]. This attack can also happen when an output action
was presented or happening.
The third point is where data turned to a digital format (binary/floating/etc.) and sending
to the ML system or output receiving from ML (Assuming the ML system is on a cloud server or
some computational hardware). We can say it’s more of a communication channel. It could argue
that if adversarial can control this channel, he can modify the data going to the ML or coming
from ML. Low perturb-based attacks can occur here as no environmental factors will diminish the
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noise. However, we can also say that if someone can control this network, he might not need to
add adversarial noises; he can directly add his desired class input for his expecting output. Also,
if he can modify the output result no need for adversarial perturb noises. Yet, this scenario should
be considered as might the attacker don’t have complete control of the communication channel
and can only add slight perturbs.
In the fourth point, the attack can also happen if the system (example: server) is
compromised. This scenario, also similar to the third point. It more of an intrusion in the system.
Low perturbs attack can happen, but we can see that if the attacker already compromised the
server, he doesn’t need to compromise the input. It is easier for him to change the output label, as
he already compromised the system. We can argue that the intruder’s ability is limited, so that he
will prefer adversarial attacks.
The fifth point is very different compare to other points, and this attack can happen before
the ML model has been set up on the server. Some Trojans or backdoor can be added in the ML
before deployment, which is only activated for specific inputs.
Additional point which is not presented in the figure was adaptive attack. An attacker can
run different test input to determine the decision boundary of ML model. Also, as adversarial
attacks are transferable attack generated in another system will work in here.
From our above discussion, it is evident that adversarial attacks can happen outside the
physical world that can make an ML model provide wrong output.
Based on our previous discussion, we can see adversarial defenses each have a different
implementation. For example, adversarial training or distillation technique requires training the
ML model, resulting in data scientist purview. A prepossessing approach such as feature
squeezing types of defense may employ by system engineering in run-time. But the limitations of
these defense techniques create a challenge for the concerned parties. Pre-processing methods can
protect most of the standard adversarial attack, and it can employ when input sensors are
converting to digital format.
Second point attack, as described in figure 3.3 may concern with knowledge concerning
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hardware security or IoT device security, or firmware security. This part interacts with humans, so
human-computer interaction-based defenses (trust models?) may fall in this area.
Pre-processing-based adversarial defense technique can be employed here before sending over the
communication channel.
Third point attacks, as described in figure 3.3 are in the communication channel, so an
attack on this channel should be concerned by network security experts. As if this channel is
compromised, an attacker can create different attacks rather than adversarial attacks. Some of
these attacks may be a more severe threat than adversarial attacks. Computer network layer
security, data layer security also concerned here. It is in question that is it possible to use any of
the adversarial defense technique can be employed in this stage or not. It should be noted that
traditional adversarial defenses, as far as our literature review, are not applicable in this area, and
here are new research opportunities for the interested cybersecurity experts as they can explore
from adversarial attack perspectives with traditional attack types.
The fourth point directly falls in Operating system security or cloud security based on ML
implementation. It could argue that prepossess-based defense technique can also be employed
here, but if there is an intrusion in here, that we have more vital concerns than adversarial attack
as the system is already compromised. The attacker is effectively controlling the system. Many
proposed adversarial defense techniques can be implemented here. Still, all of these have a
limitation: an attacker can modify data in the OS label. He can probably corrupt the employed
defense system there too.
The fifth point of attack can be defended by checking the output with other AI systems or
conducting thorough testing. Effectively as the ML model is, black box system engineers or
cybersecurity has a minimal role here. Data scientists can develop some algorithms to test the ML
model after deployment to discover this issue. We considered this to be the most concerning
attack points as it is hard to address and may need extensive regular testing.
The adaptive attack is another grave concern, which is also hard to defend as adversarial
inputs are transferable. It can tackle with dynamic ML model configuration, regular update, or
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active learning system. It can also help if employ a defense system to identify attack query
pattern, which can relate to DDoS attacks. However, one downside of adaptive attack is it is a
computationally expensive and time-consuming attack for a system that is regularly updating.
From the above discussion, we prepared the table 3.6, where we illustrated what part of defense
Attack point
Input Modification
Sensor,I/O device
Communication Channel
Internal OS system
Model Structure
Adaptive attack

Defense
Preprocess technique
Testing and Reliability
Network defense, Cryptography
Intrusion detection, Access control
Formal methods
Dynamic and active learning

Role
System/Software devs
Devops /AIops
Network and IT security
Network and IT security
Data/ML scientist
Data/ML scientist/Network

Table 3.6: Different attack points and relevant responsible professional
falls in which security domain. This table is an attempt to divide the roles, and we can assume
there was more intercommunication between different roles required to implement a robust
defense system.
It is evident that in the literature survey we did in previous chapter, most of the defense
strategies except prepossessing techniques are not suitable in deployed environments. Developing
an adversarial defense technique that can work deployed environment and cover all the attack
points still a challenge to researchers.
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Chapter 4
Step by Step Investigation

4.1
4.1.1

Input Filters (library)
Feature Extraction strategy

Adversarial samples are distorted versions of non-adversarial samples. This distortion can
measure in euclidean distances or pixel difference distance. However, I assume some image
processing algorithms can signify the misuse of an adversarial example in a way that significance
can be used to filter out adversarial examples. As an example, if an adversarial image has added
perturb pixel all around its main edges, an edge-preserving technique algorithm can remove these
perturb. So differences after-before image have a significant value which makes it distinguishable
than a non-adversarial picture.
Let, Adversarial image sets are As + s , and clean image set is As , and Filter Set denoted
by FF ilterSet , s is total added perturb of all adversarial images So, after applied Filter Set on
adversarial and clean image set I will get,
FF ilterSet (As + s ) ≈ As + s + Ka
FF ilterSet (As ) ≈ As + K
where K, Ka is the approximate effect of Filter Set in clean and adversarial image set So
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Figure 4.1: First rows show how different types of attack change a clean image (for visual purpose,
the effects are exaggerated. This row is created from observation and not real sample). The second
rows are actual corresponding real attacks on the MNIST dataset. Where 8 recognized as a different
label.
the difference DI is
DI ≈ |(As + s ) − (As + s + Ka )) − (As − As − K)|
DI ≈ As + s − As − s − Ka − As + As + K|
DI ≈ |K − Ka | I can see that in the DI equation no image (A or As ) is present. Here, aim is
analyze the effects not the core image/image content but pre-processing effects. Note: K, Ka is
the generalized approximate effect of Filter Set in clean and adversarial image set,
In testing time, I can calculate the ki value for the testimage i by applying FF ilterSet .Here
ki is the generalize effects from applied Filter Set. Now i will be a adversarial image if
|K − ki | > |ka − ki |.
.
I developed a denoising approach to detect adversarial inputs using a sequence of image
filters. This work inspired by Prakas et al.[158]. Adversarial samples are distorted versions of
non-adversarial samples, such distortions can be measure in Euclidean distances or pixel
difference distance. My hypothesis is that, some Filters can signify the distortions of an
adversarial example in a way that significance can be used to filter out adversarial examples. For
instance, if an adversarial image has added perturbed pixels all around its main edges, an
edge-preserving technique can remove these perturbations. The differences before and after
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Figure 4.2: In the top side, Clean (class A) vs Adversarial (B which classified as other class)
images differences after Filter Set applied, Histogram calculation on the difference, In bottom,
MNIST with FGSM example has shown
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Figure 4.3: Effects of Several Filters techniques on CIFAR dataset.after applying different Filters,
DI was done from grey-scaled image

Figure 4.4: In the right side, clean (0), FGSM(1) and JSMA(2) samples were applied with AS
Filters and using KNN[225] with the Histogram average value of DI and euclidean distance
value,Similarly in the left side, clean (0), FGSM(1) and JSMA(3) and DF(2) samples were applied with AN + AS Filters s effects. I can see DF, Jsma is overlapping there.
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Data
Manipulation attack

Sequence for
Dataset (MNIST)

Sequence for Dataset
(CIFAR)

FGSM

BS+BS

Greysale+AN+AN

JSMA

TN+BS

PX+grey-scale+BS

CW

TN+TN+TN or
GS+GS+GS+TBS

GS+greyscale +GS+TBS
+TN+TN

DeepFool

GS+AN+GS+AN

GreySale+AN+AN+AN

Reason
perturbation which added
in image is not an
edge, so edge-preserving algorithm
remove these,
so differences of before after
adversarial image inputs are
higher than non=adverse image
JSMA extend some edge which
reduced when I do thinning
In CW object
edge getting thinning
and blur,so applying more
blur and thinning algorithm
difference will amplify
Deepfool create few pixel
arround border to effect
the model,using
additive noise boost
this effect and
I can have a difference

Table 4.1: Different ilters for different adversarial attack type

Figure 4.5: 4 Filters applied to 5 types of the adversarial set with a clean sample set for the MNIST
dataset. In X-axis, no of each sample shows and Y axis, Before and after effects histogram average
has been illustrated. From this small set I can see, different Filters has different effects for different
attack types
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Figure 4.6: Effects of Several Filters techniques on MNIST dataset, after applying different Filters
processed images can be measured by different metrics (E.g: Histogram difference). These
metrics will have significantly different values from the clean dataset’s same metrics. We can
differentiate between non-adversarial and adversarial images using these metrics. It could be
possible that one unique sequence of edge-preserving and other Filters could make it more
distinguishable than other sequences, thereby providing metrics of such differences to be used as
a threshold value to classify adversarial and non-adversarial images.

4.2

Ensemble the Input Filters

There are numerous Filters that exist. Each can perform different operations in images. So, for a
specific type of attack, a specific type of Filters sequence will work better. From my empirical
observation, we can select a diverse set of unique Filters’s such as BS, thinning [66], AN, blur
[203], sharpen [67], thickening [66], and AS. These techniques and their combinations are best
suited to maximize enhancement between the difference image (DI)’s of adversarial and clean
input. It can be observed in Figure 4.1 that, for the MNIST dataset, FGSM method tends to add
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Figure 4.7: Here, the transformation of additive noise and adaptive smoothing filter and the difference between original and filtered images are illustrated. We use the histogram value from the
difference image as my feature metrics. On the right side, fourier transformation effect and SNR
values difference of adversarial and clean input value. We can also notice a pattern in the red arrow
between adversarial(FGSM) and clean images.
pixelate noise around the object in the image, while JSMA seems to add along with the object
borders, and CW tends to lose some erosion, whereas DF adds a very small amount of perturbing.
Therefore, I assumed that sharpening can help to highlight JSMA attacks, performing blur will
have more effect in CW, and AS will have a good effect on FGSM attacks. In figure 4.4, I can see
different Filter Set can work better for different attack types. So, I selected these Filter Set, and
found a combination of these Filter Set that performs better. If I consider different datasets (e.g.,
ImageNet, CFIAR), I have to consider different Filter Set, thus I select variety sets of Filter Set,
which can perform required all basic operations.
Filter techniques can be seen as input transformation/conversion techniques, which can
modify any input to another input where specific properties of the original information are
modified/transformed. We used approx 50 filters in my experiments, such as adaptive smoothing
(AS), additive noise (AN), bilateral smoothing (BS), Gaussian blur, sharpen operation, thickening
operation, Fourier transformation, Laplace transformation, log-polar conversion, wavelet
conversion, etc. In table 1, a list of filters used in my experiment for adversarial input detection
are provided. Figure ??, we presented the filtered output of the MNIST image. We can see the
difference images have distinct characteristics for adversarial and nonadversarial images. In my
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Filter Family
ANALYTICAL
EDGE Base

Noise Add

Noise Reduce

Texture

Transform

Code

Filter Name

FT4
FT10
FT5
FT11
FT16

Distance
Morph
Canny
Sobel
Gaussian edge
Median Blur
Average Blur
Gaussian Blur
Gaussian Noise
Dilation
opening
Closing
SaltAndPepper
SierraDithering
Erosion
Sharpen
Shrink
OilPainting
Pixellate
Wavelet
Gabor
Census
Top_Hat
BlackHat
Lapalce
Fourier
Exponential
Log-polar
Mirror
TopHat
WaterWave

FT1
FT7

FT13
FT12
FT0
FT6

FT14
FT2
FT8

FT9
FT3
FT15

Attack Method
FGSM BIM PGD
50
70
70
75
70
70
75
75
75
50
75
50
75
70
75
65
60
65
70
70
70
70
65
70
60
50
60
70
70
70
75
70
75
70
50
70
75
75
75
70
70
50
75
55
75
70
70
75
50
50
55
75
50
75
50
70
50
70
75
70
50
70
50
55
55
55
70
50
70
70
50
75
70
75
60
55
55
75
50
50
50
50
55
75
55
50
75
55
50
55
75
50
75

JSMA
50
60
70
75
75
55
70
60
65
75
65
75
75
70
70
50
55
70
50
50
50
70
75
55
75
75
75
65
60
75
70

Table 4.2: List of the filters and their accuracy against different attack (250 adversarial inputs for
each attack type) on MNIST dataset (ACOORD.net library used for experiment) (Note: here we
only provided successful detection rate).
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study, we extracted features from input data such as Signal to Noise (SNR), Peak Signal Noise
Ratio(PSNR), Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Histogram[96], Local Binary Pattern(LBP).

4.3

Generation of filter Sequence

The phenomenon which we briefly described previous sections assures us it is sufficient to detect
adversarial images that have distinguishable noises because if an adversarial image doesn’t have
distinguishable noises they hardly exist in the physical domain. It also shows that filters from
different types are better for detecting all types of attacks, and we don’t need to test against all
attack types. We also need a balanced sample set of training datasets as we showed that these
filters are transferable. Based on these, we decided to select a set of filters in a specific sequence
dynamically for each input data. There will be an optimum certainty that one of the chosen filters
can detect the adversarial traits in the input data by the fastest possible feasible time and will be
independent of ML or AA types and immune to adaptive attacks. In the table 4.3, we can see the
shorter sequence of filter has the same accuracy but the lower computational time. In that table
two sequences result over different dataset and different attack type was presented. It is also
visible that the overall accuracy of detection rate and specific attack type accuracy is different.
For example, in sequence 1, total accuracy is 97%, but for FGSM, it is 100%.
Sequence 1
Dataset
Accuracy
Attack Types
Accuracy
Error Margin

FT1-FT2-FT3-FT4-FT5-FT6-FT7-FT8-FT9-FT10-FT11-FT12-FT13-FT15-FT16-FT17 (time : 89s for 1000 test image)
MNIST
98 (10 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
100
100
90
0
0
7

DF
90
5

Sequence 2
Dataset
Accuracy
Attack Types
Accuracy
Error Margin

EMNIST
98 (10 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
100
100
94
0
0
4

DF
90
9

FMNIST
98 (10 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
100
100
90
0
1
6

DF
90
5

CFIAR
94 (6 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
98
95
80
8
5
12

DF
70
10

CFIAR
92 (6 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
97
95
75
9
15
12

DF
68
12

FT1-FT4-FT6-FT8-FT9-FT13-FT15 (time :70s for 1000 test image)
MNIST
98 (10 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
100
100
85
0
0
7

DF
90
5

EMNIST
98 (10 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
100
99
90
1
1
6

DF
90
9

FMNIST
98 (10 types of attack)
FGSM
JSMA
CW
100
99
90
1
21
6

DF
90
5

Table 4.3: Smaller sequences have similar performance as long sequences, but take less computational time. Here, Sequence 1 is consists of all the filters and has the same accuracy for different
AAs (here, four specific AA result from ten different filters provided) as shorter sequence (2) but
with less time.
Due to the process flow, the filter sequence with the same filters has a different
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computational time. As a better performing filter reduce the number of the image comes to the
next filter in sequence, But it is also observed that different filter has different computation time.
So it is unwise to put the best performing filter first in the sequence. There are two types of
processing time applied here: file transfer/read time and filter processing time for each input. File
read time is equal for all filter, but the different filter has different process time. Lets assume, File
transfer/read time is Tf , Filters input processing times are t1 , t2 ...tn w.r.t to Filters
F T1 , F T2 ...F Tn . So each filter total consumes time for N number of input:

T imeF Ti = N × (Tf + ti )

(4.1)

here, i = 1, 23..n
In a sequence filter can be any order, and each filters are overlap their accuracy among
adversarial samples. As example, Filter A and Filter B both have 50% accuracy, but cumulatively
accuracy can still be low as 50% as they are able to detect same adversarial samples. Lets assume
in a sequence F T1 − F T2 − F T3 ... − F T9 , adversarial detection probabilities are P1 , P2 , P3 , ...Pn .
So approximate time for the sequence will depend on the following equation

T imeapprox = T1 + (1 − P 1)T2 + (1 − P1 )(1 − P2 )T3 + ....
T imeapprox =

X

Tn

n−1
Y

(1 − Pi )

(4.2)
(4.3)

i=1

We need multiple solutions because we can not use the same sequence of filter for every
input. This will create an opportunity of adaptive attack. A sequence could be any length. Search
for optimal set of sequences are massive computational time, if we do exhaustive search
considering multiple objectives. That’s why we will employ a multi-objective GA to search for
the optimal set of sequences. For search filters, we need to consider different factors besides their
accuracy. Based on our objective, our filters need to be fast, that’s why filters order are important
because separate order of the filter will consume different amounts of time. It is preferable then
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our solution is time efficient. According to PH6 and PH7, we need to make sure that there is a
diverseness of filter type in our set of filters. If we have a diverse type of filter that out filter will
work against the untested attack and thus reduce the zero-day vulnerability. In our solution, we
have to deal with two kinds of diversity:
1. Insider Diversity (Diversity of filter family in a sequence): As illustrated in figure 4.13, if
only a few filter families are represented in a sequence, we will see lack of insider diversity.
It requires different filter families to be effective against a different set of attacks. It is not
possible to test all of the attacks, so for the safeguard, it is better to have a sequence from
different filter families. Also, filters from the same family work the same way, so multiple
filters present from the same family do not increase efficiency much higher.
2. Set Diversity (Diversity of the filter in the set of sequence): We will make a dynamic
selection of a sequence from a set of filter sequences. If this set of sequences were made of
the same filters that the purpose of dynamic selection will be lost. An attacker can assume
which filters have been in use and employ back pass differential attack [32], which can
bypass filter techniques. So we need to make our sequences unique. In the illustrated figure
4.13, an example of set diversity is provided.
In summary, we need a time-efficient,to produce a reliable performance and a unique set
of sequence. Our designed multi-objective GA can achieve all these criteria. The purpose of using
a genetic search is to find a diverse sequence of filters detecting AAs with maximum accuracy
while each filter is having different characteristics and capabilities when deployed such a
sequence adaptively (interchangeably) in a ML that will be unpredictable to attackers compared
to a static ensemble of well-known filters. So the GA will find not only the best filter ensemble,
but also a set of diverse filter sequences in multi-objective Pareto-front. In section 4.3.2, we
detailed how our designed GA is achieving this. In order to implement this integrated approach,
we proposed the AEF framework (illustrated in figure 5.5)) that will select a set of filters in a
specific sequence dynamically for each input data. There will be an optimum certainty that one of
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the selected filters can detect the adversarial traits in input by the fastest possible time and will be
independent of a ML and immune to adaptive attacks. Collection of these filters will be generated
using a multi-objective variable-length diversity sensitive genetic algorithm (A top-level view of
GA illustrated in the figure 4.8).

Figure 4.8: Genetic Algorithm (GA) for generating filter sequence list
If we use a random sequence selection instead of GA, we will get the low performed
sequence as presented in figure 4.11.

4.3.1

Filter Sequence Search Space

If we have N number of filter, than total possible number of sequence will be our search space.
We can formulate our search space by below equation:

Searchspace =

N
X
k=0
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N!
N ! − k!

(4.4)

(a) The basic flow diagram for the filter sequence list generates pro- (b) Basic flow diagram when our input filcess. It is visible that we don’t need any ML information. We only ters(1) running to protect a ML(2). (Note: We
need a training dataset(or a balanced part of the training dataset). are not sending modified input to the ML, we
are sending original input to the ML if we detected that as clean)

Figure 4.9: Flow chart in different stage of operation.
For 50 filter size of our search space has approx 8.26X1064 search items. If we don’t consider
time efficiency then we don’t need to order in a combination of sequence (For different order a
sequence accuracy remain static but time efficiency change). So search space will be less, since
order in a combination is not important. For single objective (Only detection rate as
F1score/accuracy) our search space will be formulated by below equation:

SearchspaceAccuracy =

N
X
k=0

N!
k!(N ! − k!)

(4.5)

For 50 filter size of our search space is approx 1.126X1015 .
We can optimize our search space by limiting the minimum sequence length and
maximum sequence length. Than our equation will be :

OptimizedSearchspace =

NX
−max
k=min
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N!
N ! − k!

(4.6)

Here, min and max are the minimum and maximum length of a filter sequence. In our experiment,
we have 17 filters and minimum length were 6, our optimized experimental search space has
consist of 9.6614 search item.

Figure 4.10: Both sequence has 95% accuracy(Not F1) and same size but top sequence has less
time.Steps of adversarial input, detecting sequential by each filter is presented, we can see that
reordering these sequences will change the number of undetected images for the next filter. So for
different sequence processed time varies but detection accuracy remain same. (Note: here a simple
example used for illustration, where FT1 and FT2 has no overlap detection)

4.3.2

GA Methodology

We have three steps in our experimentation process as shown in figure 4.9. First, we created the
ranges of each filter as seen in figure 1 marked (1), then we generate attack samples for our
testing purposes as marked (2). Using these test-samples we implement a GA to search for
appropriate filter sets that are suitable for different attack types. In 4.9, we illustrated our basic
flow diagram for the testing process. We first select a random sequence and used it as our input
filters (marked 1) to detect an AA from the learning model/ML (marked 2). If our filter detects it
as adversarial, we add it in our attack samples and if it is a clean image, than we send it to the ML
and also add it in our training dataset.
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Figure 4.11: Here, X-Axis is the generated sequence, and the y-axis has the detection accuracy
of the sequences. In blue, we represented the average random sequence, and in orange, we have
sequences after 20 iterations of a GA for the SHAPE dataset using 12filters. We can see that randomly select a sequence has a meager chance to have good accuracy, whereas choosing a sequence
from GA results will guarantee higher accuracy.
Generate metrics ranges for each filters
Algorithm 1 Generate min,max metrics for a filter (FT)
let, min = 0, max = M AXIN T , ST Ddev = 0,SU M = 0,SU M2 = 0
sampledataset has N number of trainingdata ,
for Each trainingdata td in sampledataset do
value = metrics(td) {Metrics function for filter FT}
if min<value then
min=value
end if
if max>value then
max=value
end if
SU M = SU M + value, SU M 2 = SU M2 + (value × value)
end for
ST Ddev =

p
(SU M2 − (SU M × SU M )/N )/(N − 1)

min = min − ST Ddev , max = max + ST Ddev
return min,max
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Figure 4.12: Population of GA represented, Here each individuals are variable length, In crossover
and mutation duplicate occurrences were removed. Different order of sequence provide same
accuracy but different time as we can see for sequence 4 and 6. Three objectives were presented
we can see longer length does not guarantee accuracy or diversity

Figure 4.13: ’Insider Diversity’ and ’Set Diversity’ Explanation, In the Left side, we can see two
sequences where one has insider diversity one has not, and left side, we can see which set has the
set diversity.
First, we need to process the ML’s training dataset and run all the filters and calculate their
metrics value. We ran a randomly picked balanced subset of inputs from the data set and applied
each of our filters and gather their Min, Max. Using algorithm 1 for each filter.
Now, if Mean is µ̄, Standard deviation is σ, Our lower range (Lr ) and upper range(Ur )
calculation denoted by equation 5.2 and 5.3

Lr = M in −

σ
µ̄

(4.7)

Ur = M ax +

σ
µ̄

(4.8)

Using equation 5.2,5.3 for 17 filters, we generated list of upper and lowerange. In figure 5.2 we
can observe that most of the attack samples SNR values are outside upper and lower range of
clean samples.
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Figure 4.14: Here, X-Axis is the iteration number, and Y-axis has presented the average of α(s)∀S.
We can see that some of the filters dominate at the top whenever we reach a local optimum. We save
these sequences and remove these filters from the rest of the population. The immediate effect of
the average accuracy dropped, but that picked up again. We continue to drop off dominated filters
until the x-axis is stuck in a lower optimum than the threshold.
Algorithm 2 GA algorithm for Sequence Search( filter Set :F S)
1: Minimum accuracy =Mi ,
2: Get metrics set M S from all training data (Clean+Adversarial) for all filter F in F S using algorithm 1
3: Generate N random sequences from F S -> population P
4: while MAX iteration reached or global optima reached do
5:

Generate fitness value F V all Sequence in P using equation 5.10

6:

Run suboperation for all Sequence in P using equation 4.18

7:

Sort all Sequence in P based on fitness value

8:

if Local optima reached & average fitness > Mi then

9:

Do dropoff using algorithm 4 dropoff(P) ->SEQP OOL , SEQ

10:

P = SEQ , SEQP OOL − > Collectionseq

11:

goto step 5

12:

end if

13:

Remove lower half of P

14:

Do crossover with first half using PMX algorithm and add the children in P

15:

Do a inversion mutation

16: end while
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We apply MOGA for searching a set of filter sequence which can detect maximum attack
samples. Our GA has the following characteristics:
1. Our MOGA has a variable-length chromosome. As the optimal filter sequences could be
any length, we need to make our GA multi-variable size supported.
2. We have 3 objectives to fill (accuracy, diversity and time) as mentioned in section ?? and
detailed in section 4.3.2.
3. Our end collection of sequences set needs to be diverse; that’s why we have a drop off
operation (described in section 4.3.2) when we reach local optima.
4. To find the best time conserving order of a sequence, we have a sub-operation.(described in
equation 4.18)
5. We prefer to have a simpler sequence. That’s why the added penalty function prioritizes the
smaller length sequence than the larger length (described in equation 5.9).
6. To faster the GA, we used adaptive weight values, prioritizing objective based on the GA
average fitness. (described in equation 5.10)
Encoding and Individuals First, we encoded all filters according to table 4.2. Here, 17
algorithms were assigned sequence number F T 1, F T 2...F T 17. In the leftmost column, the class
type of these algorithms is mentioned. These filters are our genes. We will create our
individuals/chromosome using these genes.
Using the filters encoded in table 4.2, we generated the population by random sequence
generation. So each is consist of different length of filters. We remove multiple occurrences of
filters in a single sequence. In figure 4.12, the encoding of filters are illustrated with different
examples.
As example a random sequence F T 2F T 5F T 11F T 12 means Blur -Census - Morph Canny. That way, we generated multiple lengths of sequences as our initial population.
Fitness Function
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We have three objectives. they are Accuracy (α), time to detection(β) and Insider
diverseness(γ) of filters in sequence. Accuracy is the success rate of detection by the filters.
We used F1 score as Accuracy value. We calculate F1 score using detection rates as
described in below. Here, number of filter = n and S = fi , fi , .fn is the sequence
P
True positive T P = ni=0 T P
P
False positive F P = ni=0 F P
P
False Negative T P = ni=0 F N

P recision =
Recall =

TP
TP + FP

TP
TP + FN

(4.9)
(4.10)

So Detection accuracy F1 score is

α(S) = F 1 = 2 ∗

P recision ∗ Recall
P recision + Recall

(4.11)

For time, if each filter take ti time, then total time to detection δt can be calculated by

β(S) =

n
X

t

(4.12)

i=0

For insider diverseness, for each filer fi ∈ Fi , here F is the filter family and f is the filter, S is the
sequence.
P
γ(S) =

f ∈ F |f ∩ S| > 0
P
F

(4.13)

As example,we have total 1000 adversarial samples and 1000 Non-Adversarial Sample.
For each filter in the sequence, we see if the adversarial images metrics (ex:SNR) are outside the
range we stored for that filters lower range (Lr ) and upper range(Ur ). As for
S = F T 2 − F T 5 − F T 11 − F T 12 => Blur -Census - Dither -Canny. Here n = 4 and other
metrics are
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Filter: Correctly Detected (T Pi ): Wrong detection(F Pi ): Remaining(F Ni ): Time (Ti )
F T 2 : 220 : 05 : 1000 − 200 = 780 : 0.03s
F T 5 : 110 : 15 : 780 − 110 = 670 : 0.02s
F T 11 : 200 : 10 : 670 − 200 = 470 : 0.015s
F T 12 : 220 : 10 : 470 − 220 = 250 : 0.01s

For the above example it is, T P = 750, F P = 40, F N = 250 so, α = 0.8380 from
equation 5.4, Time is 0.03 + 0.2 + 0.15 + 0.01 = 0.75s.
As for Blur-Census-Dither-Canny. Here, Blur and Dither are from same class, and others
are from 2 different class. So diverseness is

2+1+1=4
6

= 0.66. We Normalized all three objective

data using equation 5.7
Xsc =

X − Xmin
.
Xmax − Xmin

(4.14)

We inversed the Time data, so we have to maximize all of the objectives. Our fitness function
denoted by
max(f(S)) = ((αn (S)), (βn (S)), (δn (S)))

(4.15)

where, αn is normalized accuracy, βn is normalized inverse time, δn is diverseness factors.
We have penalty function to prioritize simpler solution and weight values to speed up the GA
process. Let assume, Weight Value, W0 = 0.90 −

1
100−iterationnumber

and Weight Value, W1 = 1 − W0
We observed that, in the beginning α is low and after a certain iteration γ gets lower. We
use W0 for α and W1 for γ.
In the figure 4.20, we visualized the effect of weight to speedup the GA process.
For penalty functions we need below parameters
Length of Best fitted individual in previous iteration | maxf (Si ) ∈ ∀(S)|
Size of current Sequence = |S|
P
Total number of filters = ni=0 |f | ∈ ∀F
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Figure 4.15: Here X-axis has the iteration number, and the Y-axis has the average length of the
sequence. We can see with a penalty, the average size of the sequence tends to smaller. This
experiment was done with 12 filters with 4 different datasets.
Equation for penalty function value can be denoted by
f(S) |S| − | maxf (Si ) ∈ ∀(S)|
Pn
×
100
i=0 |f | ∈ ∀(F )

(4.16)

p
(αn (S)2 × W0 + βn (S)2 + δn (S))2 × W1 − pf(S)

(4.17)

pf(S) =

So from equation 5.8, fitness for S is

f(S) =

In figure 4.15, it is visible that with the penalty function, length of sequences are lower than
without penalty functions. That way, our GA prioritizes to search smaller sequences. Also, a
shorter time is co-related with sequence length. So β(s) also affects having more straightforward
sequences.
We created the 3D Pareto front using the three objectives from each individual. A
non-dominated rank is assigned to each individual using the relative distance in 3D space. In
figure 4.16 and 4.19, some individuals fitness functions are presented. For each individual, we ran
another sub-operation to find the lowest time of the sequence order. This sub operation is done by
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random search or genetic search for the fastest combination of filters in that individual/sequences.

For a Sequence ’S’, we take all filter f ∈ S and try fk to create Si=0..k Sequences and return the
sequence with best β(Si ). We replace current S with Si in the population. so equation for sub
operation is
Snew =

min f (S)

β(Si )∈(fk)

(4.18)

As example, if our S = (F T 9 − F T 3 − F T 6 − F T 2) we will try K number of
combination using F T 9, F T 3, F T 6, F T 2 like
S1 = (F T 3 − F T 9 − F T 2 − F T 6),S1 = (F T 2 − F T 9 − F T 3 − F T 6)
...SK = (F T 3 − F T 9 − F T 6 − F T 2) and will replace the S by the Si with best βSi . If the
individual’s length is L, then the search space for sub-operation is L!. If (500 ≤ L!), than we do a
simple random search. Otherwise, we do a simple GA for finding the best time optimized filter
combination.

(a) Here, Pink is time efficiency, black is length
efficiency, and blues are each individual’s accuracy. Red points are 3d vectors of each individual, and greens are the Pareto front where no one
is dominate

(b) Best fitness value as GA iteration (per iteration= X-axis
value X 5) progressed for four different data-set. We can see
that for CFIAR it need more iteration to reach fitness over
90.

Figure 4.16: MOGA Pareto front and performances illustrated.
Selection, Crossover and Mutation We used elitist strategy with rank Selection. We keep
the best performing filters for next generation. We did PMX crossover as we need unique values
in a sequence. An example of PMX cross over is
Parent 1: FT8 FT4 FT7 FT3 FT6 FT2 FT5 FT1 FT9 FT0
Parent 2: FT0 FT1 FT2 FT3 FT4 FT5 FT6 FT7 FT8 FT9
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Child 1: FT0 FT7 FT4 FT3 FT6 FT2 FT5 FT1 FT8 FT9
Here, from parent one we pick a random part and test of the part we took from other two
parent using PMX crossover algorithm[41]. In PMX crossover, parent 1 gives a genetic element,
and the identical swath from the other parent is sprinkled about in the child. After that, the
surviving alleles are lifted straight from parent 2.
Algorithm 3 PMX Selection algorithm (Parent 1, Parent 2)[41]
1: Randomly select a part from parent 1 and copy them directly to the child. Note the indexes of the

segment.
2: Looking in the same segment positions in parent 2, select each value that hasn’t already been copied to

the child.
3: while For each of these values: do
4:

Note the index of this value in Parent 2. Locate the value, V, from parent 1 in this same position.

5:

Locate this same value in parent 2.

6:

If the index of this value in Parent 2 is part of the original swath, go to step 3. using this value.

7:

If the position isn’t part of the original swath, insert Step A’s value into the child in this position.

8: end while
9: Copy any remaining positions from parent 2 to the child.
10: return Child

For mutation, we did a inversion mutation,where one gene of an individual replaces by
another gene. In our method, we pick a random index and random filter from ∀(@f ∈ S). As
example, for sequence
S = F T 2 − F T 3 − FT5 − F T 8 − F T 9 ,
we pick random index 2, and random filter FT10, so new sequence
Snew = F T 2 − F T 3 − FT10 − F T 8 − F T 9.
Drop-Off Operation
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Algorithm 4 drop-off algorithm (SEQ = Seq1, Seq2, ...Seqn , Remove K item, Partition P,
SEQP OOL )
1: Sort the Sequences based on their fitness values
2: first n/P sequences -> SEQtop ->SEQP OOL
3: Itemnumber = 0
4: while Itemnumber 6= K do
5:

most common item T in SEQtop

6:

remove T from every Sequence in SEQtop & SEQ

7:

Itemnumber = Itemnumber + 1

8: end while
9: return SEQ and SEQP OOL

Figure 4.17: Y-axis presents the diversity value, and the X-axis represents the total number of experiments. The difference in diversity values from sequences generated by different GA method
is illustrated. After GA generated sequence, we randomly picked three sequences seven times
and showed their total diversity value. We can see with drop off functionality, we reach maximum diversity. Without drop off and diversity objectives, it failed to cover half of the family.This
experiment was done in MNIST dataset
To maintain the diversity, landscape aware method introduces by [122] or a noise-based
approach introduces by [11] can be used. Landscape conscious process consumes more
computational complexity, and the noise-based system would be hard to encode in our problem,
thats why we introduce a simple concept of dropoff to keep set diversity. We observed that only a
handful of filters are dominated the GA. It makes the dynamic selection pool vulnerable as all of
the sequences are made with common filters. An attacker can guess these filters in a white box
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setup and use the BPDA attack to bypass this defense technique. That way, whenever we reached
an optimum, we save the best performing Sequence as a distinguished pool and remove the most
common filters in these sequences. We provided an algorithm 4 which move the good sequence as
a pool of sequence for dynamic section and remove the dominated filter from the current
population. In figure 4.14 this is illustrated, here we can see we get three pools of sequences. In
the dynamic selection, we randomly select one sequences from each of these three pools to test an
attack is adversarial or not. We have a threshold for dropoff number (Dn ), if top K number of
Sequence (Si=0..k ) has more than (Dn ) common filter, we save Si=0..k in a pool, and remove
common filters from all the Sequence in current population. Remove filters can be extracted from
below equation
∃fi=0..Dn = S1 ∩ S2 ∩ ........ ∩ Sk

(4.19)

In the figure 4.17, the importance of dropoff is presented. In that figure, we provided a diversity
of 3 sequences each time. It seems in a single objective without dropoff, all of the sequences are
from 2-3 classes. But with dropoff and with diversity objective, the sequences generated from GA
are from 5-6 different classes.

4.3.3

Experimental Results and analysis

Figure 4.18: For N iterations best accuracy and best time-cost were plotted. Here we can see
time and accuracy were not equally progressed. But after we get a good F1 score individuals time
started to improved.
In table 4.4, we presented the first 15 individuals and their accuracy and time. The first
column has a sequence of filters. We can see that different sequence has the same accuracy, but
they have additional time cost. For example, the third row has sequences 11 and 5 with accuracy
92

Figure 4.19: For N iterations, average accuracy and best accuracy was plotted. We can see that in
the initial state when the sequence was utterly random, accuracy was below 50%, but after several
iterations, it started to go higher

Figure 4.20: Here X-axis has the iteration number, and the Y-axis has fitness. We can see for
MNIST without accuracy, GA requires 63 iterations to reach a fitness over 98. Whereas with the
weight, we can get the same fitness by 40 iterations. This experiment was done with 12 filters with
MNIST, EMNIST, F-MNIST, Shape Dataset, and CFIAR dataset.
98% detection rate by taking 0.45S. Whereas 7th row 15,8,3,7 has 77% accuracy and take 0.86s
as time cost. In figure 4.16, we illustrated a chart of different dataset GA performances. Where
we can see MNIST, EMNIST and F-MNIST are faster than CFIAR. While running the GA, we
did 100 iterations, and we plotted average accuracy and best accuracy in figure 4.18. We can see
blue as the best accuracy reached about 95% after 15 iterations, but the average accuracy came
above 95% after 35 iterations. We need a set of sequences. So we need to run the iteration until at
least 40 individuals have above standard accuracy. Because if we have 40 sequences for our ML,
then the attacker probability to guess the sequence correctly will be

1
40

= 0.025. So run a

successful adaptive attack will be computationally impossible. In figure 4.19, accuracy and time
cost are plotted for all 40iterations. It is visible that the best accuracy and time cost are not
co-related. We used multi-objective functions, so lower time-cost gets prioritized in the iteration.
However, due to very small differences in the time cost between the individuals, it doesn’t
significantly impact iterations.
In table 4.6, we presented the comparison between the F1 score in test time when we use a
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individual
8, 14, 9, 13, 6, 15
5, 7, 15, 11, 12, 14
11, 5
11, 7, 6, 4, 15
11, 5, 14, 4, 8
3, 8, 9, 15, 11, 5
15, 8, 3, 7
9, 8, 13
15, 11, 12
10, 14, 9, 12
7, 3, 11, 2, 9
8, 2, 9, 12

F1
0.97880597
0.97880597
0.97880597
0.97880597
0.97880597
0.96880597
0.790522388
0.768656716
0.768656716
0.751865672
0.751865672
0.748134328

Time
0.741013
0.451521
0.363813
0.481844
0.415009
0.866414
0.686515
0.668462
0.514135
0.694747
0.839804
0.593654

Diversity
5
5
2
4
4
5
2
2
4
3
3
3

Table 4.4: Accuracy,Time, and diversity After applied different Series of filter for MNIST dataset

Naive Bayes
Random Forest
Neural Net 3
Logistic regression
GA+range(Our Technique)
Decision tree

Acc
65
99
78
65
98
99

Testing Time
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.04-0.09
0.09

Table 4.5: Metrics of Adversarial samples and clean samples from each filter used to train different
ML and their accuracy
single objective and dual objective. Here, the sequences generated from the GA has experimented
with a random set of adversarial and non-adversarial images. The test accuracy was dropped in
both scenarios. But sequences in dual objectives (which were more diverse) have less drop than
the single objective (which were less diverse). Here, we experimented multiple times F1, and
provided the F1 mean of the results, and we also offered the standard deviation to evaluate the
confidence value of these results.
Instead of using GA, if we use a random search or brute force that will also find good filter
sequences, it would require higher search coverage. In figure 4.21, we illustrated the difference
between search coverage between GA and random search. Here we only considered the single
objective, so equation 4.5 is applied here. In our experiment, we needed a more extensive search
coverage due to other objectives.
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Dataset

Sequence with single objective

MNIST
EMNIST
FASHION-MNIST
CFIAR

F1 in GA
99
98
95
90

Testing F1
87
85
89
72

std dev
1
1
1
1.5

Sequence with Dual objective
F1 in GA
97
97
92
88

Testing F1
93
92
90
83

Std dev
1
1
1
1.25

Table 4.6: A comparison between single vs. dual objective (diversity and accuracy) GA sequences
is presented. Single objective GA sequences have a larger drop in mean accuracy rate (F1-score)
than the dual objective.
Detection Method
RF based adversarial training[81]
KNN based learning [81]
SVM based learning [81]
Feature Squeezing[215]
Ensemble [15]
Decision Mismatch[141]
Image quality features [6]
AEF(Our Framework)

FGSM
0.96
0.98
0.98
1.00
0.99
0.93
1.00
1.00

MNIST
JSMA
0.84
0.80
0.89
1.00
0.93
0.90
1.00

DF
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.45
0.91
1.00
1.00

CW
0.66
0.6
1.00

FGSM
0.64
0.56
0.69
0.20
0.99
0.93
0.72
0.94

CIFAR
JSMA
0.63
0.52
0.69
0.88
0.97
0.70
0.95

Avg
DF
0.60
0.52
0.64
0.77
0.42
0.91
0.68
0.96

CW
0.72
0.69
0.77
0.94

0.77
0.73
0.81
0.77
0.71
0.93
0.83
0.99

Table 4.7: Here, we provided a comparison with other adversarial input detection techniques based
on Accuracy. On average, we outperform other methods. As examples, our methods work with
96% accuracy in the CFIAR data-set where the feature squeezing technique has 0.88% accuracy.
We also explored local search methods such as Hill climbing search. However, our
preliminary experiments on Hill climbing show evidence that it will be stuck in local maxima
after some iterations. It is possible that this problem could be solved using stochastic
hill-climbing, random walks, and simulated annealing. But implementation of those is complex
than Multi-objective GA. In GA, we have a better way to secure population diversity, which is
hard to implement in local search. Some prior literature study, as example work of [97, 213]
shows result comparison of GA vs. local search for a similar problem like our search problem,
and GA offers better performance than local search. That is the reason we opt for GA instead of
local search algorithms.
It could be argued that instead of doing a range check and GA, we can use another ML’s to
detect adversarial samples using the image metrics we generated in the first phase of our
experiments. We tested with the 5000 adversarial samples and 500 clean samples metrics dataset
(MNIST). In table 4.5, we showed the result by running different ML’s and compare with our
technique. It is visible that three-layer neural net and naive bayes perform poorly, but random
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Figure 4.21: Here, We are searching S number of sequences with accuracy over 85% only using
brute force and random forest search. For filter size 10, we weren’t able to complete the brute force
search. It is visible using GA higher accuracy filters can be found by less search from the bars.
The random search may be suitable for a lower number of filters, but the random search takes a
large coverage area than the GA search when the filter size is large.
forest and decision tree outperform us. But these techniques require more testing time, and also
this technique accuracy depends on the adversarial datasets. Another important fact is they are
also ML, so they are all vulnerable to standard AAs.

4.4
4.4.1

Output Filters
Negative Selection Based Filtering technique

We proposed a V-detector based NSA outlier detection strategy for each class label. NSA does
not require adversarial examples to classify between adversarial knowledge and clean samples.
Only a set of clean data are enough to generate a set of detectors for adversarial samples and
based on the analysis given in section 2A, which shows NSA methods are more suitable for
non-linear and limited positive samples OCC.
In the figure ??, we illustrated the process of negative detector generation. A feature
extraction technique (example : DNN based [ono2018lf] or binary feature extractions
[calonder2010brief]) will mapping feature data for each label. These features will be used as self
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data for the NSA algorithm. We will use different class labels features and each class will have
unique representation spaces as their features are different. These feature types were selected
based on which feature performs best to distinguish between one class label to other class labels.
Our experiment used a simple conv net to extract features for each class.
In the figure ??, we visualized how our NSA will interact with the ML model. ML model
will provide the output class. Using that class and the input data, the NSA will use the same
feature mapping technique for that class and try to match that class’s negative detectors.
For overall framework concept, we illustrated our proposed workflow in the figure ??. At
first, as there is no data in the clean dataset, we have to assume the first few inputs are clean input.
Based on these clean inputs and their class label, our NSA will generate the detectors for each
class; when we have enough detectors, the ML model will provide the output class for that to the
NSA when a new input comes. NSA will take the input and output class label and check that
input for that class NSA detectors set. If the input is detected as an outlier, the process will stop.
Otherwise, the information will send to a clean dataset to regenerate the detector set, and the
output class will be given as the final class output. We presented the algorithm flow chart in the
figure ??, here NSA detector re generated when a clean input is detected. This way, we
implemented relearning as new attack detectors are optimized with the new inputs and can
perform better.
One of our proposed framework’s possible limitations is that at the start, the clean data-set
is empty; thus, adequate negative detectors are not likely to generate until sufficient clean inputs
are collected. We can proceed with a sample set of clean data at the beginning to counter this
problem; otherwise, we have to assume at first system will have only clean inputs.
Attack type
FGSM
BIM
PGD

Step1
0.86
0.89.0
0.92

Step2
0.92
90.0
0.94

Step3
0.902
90.0
0.95

Step4
0.93
0.90
0.95

Table 4.8: Detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with clean
input of class label ’0’ , after sample size increased 100 in each step.
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Attack type
FGSM
BIM
PGD
MBIM
HSJ
JSMA
CW
DF

NSA
0.93
0.90
0.95
0.91
0.88
0.9
0.96
0.91

OCSVM
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.98
0.55
0.56
0.42
0.45

IF
0.93
0.91
0.92
0.94
0.41
0.8
0.66
0.76

VAE
0.65
0.66
0.50
0.46
0.65
0.83
0.52
0.55

SOGAL
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

MOGAL
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

Table 4.9: detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with clean
input of class label ’0’
Attack type
FGSM
Basic Iterative Method
PGD(random start)
MBIM
hopskipjump
JSMA
CW
DF

MNIST Class ’0’
0.93
0.90
0.95
0.91
0.84
0.9
0.96
0.91

MNIST ’1’
0.92
0.90
0.92
0.90
0.65
0.96
0.89
0.89

MNIST Class ’2’
0.93
0.91
0.92
0.94
0.80
0.8
0.86
0.96

MNIST Class ’3’
0.92
0.91
0.90
0.86
0.65
0.93
0.62
0.73

Table 4.10: adversarial attacks on MNIST class label ’0-3’ and CIFAR ’dog’ and ’airplane’ class
detection rate (each class has 200 positive and 200 adversarial samples which classifies as that
class by a CNN)

4.4.2

Feature Selection

Negative Detector generation
We experimented with MNIST digit 0,1,2,3 and CIFAR dataset ’airplane’ and ’dog’ class. For
example, We took the class label ’dog’ as a positive class. All other classes and adversarial
samples for the class dog are considered a negative class. We trained with 1000 positive data for
each class. We used a simple convolution neural network to generate a feature set for each class.
These features are used to create negative detectors for specific that class. To avoid the cold start
problem, we put 1000 positive data for each class in the clean dataset. We used the V-detector
algorithm for generating detectors.
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CIFAR ’A
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7

0.6

Detection Method
Random Forest based adversarial training[81]
KNN based adversarial training [81]
SVM based adversarial training [81]
Feature Squeezing[215]
Ensemble technique[15]
Decision Mismatch[141]
Image quality features [6]
Our Proposed Method

FGSM
0.96
0.98
0.98
1.00
0.99
0.93
1.00
0.92

MNIST
JSMA DF
0.84
0.98
0.80
0.98
0.89
0.98
1.00
0.45
0.93
0.91
0.90
1.00
0.90
0.96

CW
0.66
0.6
0.82

FGSM
0.64
0.56
0.69
0.20
0.99
0.93
0.72
0.94

CIFAR
JSMA DF
0.63
0.60
0.52
0.52
0.69
0.64
0.88
0.77
0.42
0.97
0.91
0.70
0.68
0.85

CW
0.72
0.69
0.77
-

Table 4.11: Comparison with other adversarial input detection technique based on accuracy (in
our method, for MNIST average of class 0-3 was experimented and for CIFAR only tested with
Airplane and dog class)
Defense Strategy
Adversarial Training
Ensemble Method
Pre-Processing Defense
Architecture Alteration
Our proposed Method

Attack Sample
Generation not needed
N
N
N
Y
Y

ML Model Modification
not require
Y
Y
Y
N
Y

No Accuracy
Reduction of ML
N
N
Y
N
Y

Table 4.12: Advantages of our proposed method than other methods in terms of applicability

Experiments
We experimented with 1000 positive inputs and 250 attack inputs from each attack type. The
V-detectors were initialize with 1000 clean input before. We used F1 score as Accuracy value. We
calculate F1 score using detection rates as described in below. Adversarial samples detected as
adversarial (True positive) T P , Clean samples detected as adversarial (False positive) F P ,
Adversarial samples detected as clean samples (False Negative) F N , We calculated

P recision =

Recall =

TP
TP + FP

TP
TP + FN
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(4.20)

(4.21)

Not Vul
to adap
N
N
N
N
Y

So, Detection accuracy F1 score is:

F1 = 2 ∗

P recision ∗ Recall
P recision + Recall

(4.22)

We also used other OCC techniques for comparison using pyod library[229]. We regenerate the
V-detectors after every 100 clean inputs and using the randomized set for the clean and
adversarial dataset in a batch of 200 to collect the results and provided the average F1 scores as
the final result.

4.4.3

Result Analysis

In the table 5.2, we experimented the attack sample accuracy rate with V-detector generated using
different number of clean samples. It is observed that after each iteration V-detector performance
slightly increased. In the table 5.10, we presented results against different attacks types. We can
see our defense works with different types of attack, as an example (FGSM, BIM) but result
sharply decline for the CIFAR data set. We concluded that was due to not having a better feature
mapping. It is observed that for different classes, different performance from V-detector as for
JSMA MNIST class as 80% accuracy for class label 0 but same attack type class label ’1’ has
85% accuracy.
In the table 5.3, we compare V-detector NSA results with other techniques; we can see
that OCSVM and IF performs better than NSA for gradient-based attacks for low noise attacks
NSA outperform both of them. Variable Autoencoder didn’t perform well due to a low number of
samples. SOGAL and MOGAL based techniques were failed to work with low models. NSA
works faster than them based on the results from table ??.
In an adaptive attack, such as BPDA [199], attackers bypass well known pre-process
techniques by applying a differential approximation. This differential approximation process will
not work as the detector’s position and radius change after each successful non-adversarial input.
So, the defensive filters can be changing continuously, and the attacker will not have a static
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defense to bypass. However, query-based attacks need to be detected as those can bias the
defensive filters.
In table 5.11, we compared our results with other well-known defense strategies. Our
defense technique has exhibited similar performance as other techniques but our is more effective
in detecting advanced low-noise attacks such as CW and Deepfool. Moreover, existing defense
techniques have many limitations which is evident in our comparative results shown in table 4.12.
As mentioned earlier, negative filtering strategy can work without any attack sample generation
and remain robust against current state of the adaptive attack. [171] introduced a mechanism to
leverage ’Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)’ capability to reduce adversarial perturbations’
performance. The GAN effectiveness depends on the GAN training, which is computationally
complex and needs proper understanding of the dataset. In contrast, our approach doesn’t need a
complex training method and computationally faster than GAN based defense technique.
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Chapter 5
Integrated Filtering- End-to-End

5.1

Research Findings

From our extensive literature review and empirical examination, we observed seven adversarial
phenomena. These are:
1. Advanced AAs are ineffective in the physical environment.
2. AA noises have a distinct nature that is related to the attack method.
3. Clean and adversarial inputs have identifiable noise difference.
4. Same filtering technique will work for all ML model for a specific dataset.
5. Different filters have different effectiveness to detect AA.
6. Attack methods from the same family possess weakness to the same detection filters.
7. If data-sets are similar, filter-based defenses are transferable.
8. Outlier detection methods can detect AAs as outliers.
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(a) The best performing filter from each attack method (b) Different filters have different effectiveness to dewas applied to the other attacks, and their accuracy was tect attack types. Here, each filter family average perpresented in the heatmap (MNIST Dataset).
formance was presented against different attacks. In
the green area, texture-based filters perform well in
boundary-based attack and Noise filters works better for
gradient-based attacks

Figure 5.1: Two different phenomenon PH5 and PH6 observed.

(a) Different attack type accuracy over all 3 different dataset (b) All images SNR value plotted in the x-axis(0against using the filters range generated from Fashion- 1 normalized) w.r.t filter-id. In the y-axis, blue are
MNIST. This proved filter based defense are transferable. clean inputs, and reds are adversarial images SNR
values, we can observe that most of the adversarial
inputs SNR are outside the SNR values of clean
inputs. Some of the filters there is overlap, but there
are distinct ranges present for adversarial and clean
images.

Figure 5.2: Two different phenomenon 7 and 3 observed.

103

Advanced AAs are ineffective in the physical environment.
In 2017, [112] showed that in the digital version and printed version success of adversarial
methods decline. They tried to justify their argument with FGSM, BIM, and other iterative
methods.[130, 148] experimented with FGSM, BIM, and LBFGS methods and showed the
destruction rate up of 100% based on distances invalidating these attacks.
AA noises have a distinct nature that is related to the attack method.
Different attack methods try to attack an ML model differently; for example, in the JSMA attack
method, the most significant part of the input noise is added; in the FGSM attack, a gradient loss
noises are added. In score based attack, the most significant pixel value searched and changed. In
the work of [77], these behaviors have been briefly discussed.
Clean and adversarial inputs have identifiable noise difference.
Researchers ( [158][6][77] ) demonstrate adversarial and clean images have a comparable
differences in their noise value which are identifiable for attacks such as FGSM, BIM etc. In
figure 4.7, we illustrated the noise differences between clean and adversarial images SNR metrics.
In figure 4.7 and 4.7, it was also illustrated that normal filtering technique highlighted the noise
part after pixel difference method[77], and these noises could be detected using other metrics
such as the histogram average and the local binary pattern average. In the figure 5.2 we illustrated
the adversarial example metrics value normalized in 0-1 in x-axis and presented for the different
15 filters from table 4.2. We can see that clean and adversarial images overlap, but in
cumulatively, they are distinguishable.
Same filtering technique will work for all ML model for a specific dataset
From PH2 and PH3, we can see that filters can detect AAs in data preprocess stage[158] [6][77].
That means this technique will work for the black-box model, which means defense is not
required to access or modify the ML. So if the ML changes, for example, from Resnet to Vgg or
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SVM to a Random Forest, the defense technique needs no changes. It will be completely
independent of the ML changes.
Different filters have different effectiveness to detect AAs
We have experimented with different filters, as presented in table 4.2. From this result, using filter
classification, we generated the heat-map in figure 5.1. Here, we can see that noise addition and
canceling filters are working better in the gradient-based attack, and texture-based filters are
working better for boundary-based attack types. For example, FGSM and BIM are both
gradient-based attacks, and we find out blur works against both of these attacks. This result is
expected as the second phenomenon established that AA noises have a distinct nature related to
the attack method. This phenomenon proves that picking one filter from each filter family will
have more effectiveness than selecting all the filters from the same filter family class.
Attack methods from the same family possess weakness to the same detection filters
We plotted observed average accuracy for each filter family on each attack method as illustrated
in the heatmap figure 5.1 b. It is visible that if filter works for one attack type, it will also work for
other attack types. The best performing filter for FGSM performs well in other attack-type of the
same family. That assures us that we do not need to evaluate all the attacks, but at least one from
each attack family is sufficient to assess defenses’ efficiency.
If data-sets are similar, filter-based defenses are transferable.
In figure 5.2, it is illustrated that the same filters, whose ranges are calculated using
Fashion-MNIST, is working with satisfactory results. MNIST, EMNIST, and Fashion-MNIST are
the same type of dataset.This phenomenon assures us that the AEF filter does not need the ranges
from the full dataset. A subsample min-max range will provide an efficient range to detect the
AA.
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Abbr
OCSVM [39]
LMDD[12]
LOF[22]
COF[191]
CBLOF[83]
HBOS[62]
kNN[161]
ABOD [108]
COPOD[121]
SOS[90]
IF[195]
FB [114]
XGBOD [228]
AutoEncoder[2]
VAE[105]
SO_GAAL [127]
MO_GAAL[127]
Vdetector[234]
RNSA[50]

Algorithm
One-Class SVM
Deviation-based
Local Outlier Factor
Connectivity-Based
Clustering-Based
Histogram-based
k Nearest Neighbors
Angle-Based
Copula-Based
Stochastic Selection
Isolation Forest
Feature Bagging
Extreme Boosting Based
Fully connected AutoEncoder
Variational AutoEncoder
Single-Objective GAN
Multiple-Objective GAN
Variable Size NSA
Random real value NSA

Accuracy
99
98
98
91
92
91
91
62
75
66
99
99
26
43
41
40
35
99
75

Table 5.1: List of outlier detection algorithm and their accuracy to detect adversarial (FGSM) input
of class label ’O’.

Outlier detection methods can detect AAs as outliers
The work of ruff et al.[167] shows that outlier detection methods can classify class label from
outlier samples. In multi-class classification, each class separately generate their own latent space
and outlier detected there as negative class and inliers are detected as positive class and able to
achieve 95%+ accuracy for MNIST class classification. Similar approach we experimented with
adversarial samples for single class classification. We took class label ’0’ as positive class or
inlier, all other 9 classes and adversarial samples for class 0 are considered negative class or
outlier. We trained with 1000 positive class. We used [229] developed outlier library in our
experimentation. We tested with 500 positive data, and 500 adversarial sample (FGSM samples
generated using [63] and [149]) of class label 0. The accuracy was presented in the table 5.1. We
can see that one class support vector machine and V-detector based negative selection algorithm
does better than other.
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Static defenses can by-passed by adaptive attacks
Carlini el al[32] exhibited an adaptive attack where the attacker can bypass the known defenses.
So, if the defense is not changes or remain static it will be vulnerable to adaptive attacks. Also,
more recent works showed that dynamic defense mechanism which claims effectiveness against
adaptive attacks fails against gradient based adaptive attack[198].

5.2

Overall Architecture

To build a robust ML/AI-based system against malicious adversaries, we designed a dual-filtering
(i.e., commutative filtering) scheme, which employs two filtering mechanisms: one at the input
stage (before samples are fed to the core learning model) and other at the output of ML (before
the decision module). These two filters can function independently as well as dependently (i.e., in
a commutative fashion). Specifically, the input filter’s main aim is to filter misleading and out of
distribution inputs (e.g., image of animal but not human face in a face recognition system). The
output filter’s goal is handling larger variations and restricting misclassification rates in order to
improve overall accuracy of the system. The proposed dual-filtering strategy can be used both in
training and testing phases of ML. For instance, the independent input filter may be used to detect
and deter the poising attacks in a supervised ML. Likewise, dual-commutative filters may help
addressing adversaries both in supervised and unsupervised ML. A machine learning framework
usually consists of four main modules: feature extraction, feature selection (optional),
classification/clustering, and decision. As depicted in Figure 5.3, the input filters are placed after
pre-processing of data stream/feature selection to feed to core learning model and the output
filters are placed after classification/clustering/raw decision module, respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Schematic of the proposed Dual-Filtering (DF) framework.

As can been seen in Figure 5.3, the raw input sample is first pre-processed and then fed to
the input filter to determine if the received feature/sample is benign or attack and reject
accordingly. The outcome (i.e., raw decision) by ML system is given to the output filter for
further scrutiny. The output filter uses context-information and/or communicates with the input
filter to make the correct final decision. An ensemble of different noise removal or detection
filters was applied to detect AAs in a recent work [47]. Other techniques focused mostly on
adding extra layer on a ML module by adversarial sample training or modification of deep
learning models. These defense methods have some constraints, and exposed ML models to new
vulnerabilities [76].
In 2019, some works reported launching adaptive attacks where they could bypass known
defenses [32]. To alleviate the situation, we consider a non-deterministic (white-box) approach
where the attackers cannot perceive our defenses to launch adaptive attacks. Accordingly, we
investigated an active learning[175] based dual-validation scheme which work as an extra security
(filtering) layer and improve the learning model’s trustworthiness.
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of basic flow concept for proposed Dual Inspection framework. If the input
is not adversarial, the original input (not the processed) be sent to the learning model/ML and after
ML produce class label, that labels latent space will be used in outlier method. The outlier decision
boundary and the threshold of noise will change as the dataset of adversarial and clean data set are
updated by each input.
In the figure 5.4, we illustrated the basic concept of our proposed solution. As we know
that it is possible to detect adversarial input noise using different filters, we will apply filters to
detect noise. We need to know which filter we need and the difference between the clean and
adversarial noise threshold. That’s why we first use the information from the ML model to
determine the input is an outlier for the class label the ML model is classified or not. If it is an
outlier, we will send it to the adversarial dataset. If not, we will send it to the clean dataset and
update the outlier methods decision boundary and determine the required filters and the noise
thresholds. Before update/retrain the output and input learning model, we will inspect the data for
adaptive attack patterns in the adaptive attack detection module. The figure 5.5 demonstrated our
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proposed dual inspection strategy. It is shown that the inspection before and after ML are
independent and can be deployed as a plugin. As in active learning, when the clean dataset has
some data, it will train the outlier detection techniques, and the ’inspection after ML’ module will
start to work. After the outlier finds some adversarial examples, the adversarial dataset receives
some data. When the adversarial dataset has sufficient data, our multi-objective Genetic algorithm
started the genetic search for filter sequences that are effective against the adversarial noises and
the differentiating noise thresholds for these sequences. As time progresses, MOGA will detect
more adversarial samples, and the knowledge of the outlier detection technique will transfer to
noise detection techniques. This way ML model has to process fewer adversarial examples. We
will select different filter sequences for each input and different outlier detection methods for each
input to make the defense dynamic. After each (or a specific amount of input), outlier methods
will retrain, and it will update the outlier detection decision boundary. Similarly, MOGA will
update the filters library subsequently. This way, both outlier and filter-based defense technique
will keep themselves updated as time progress. As this method can be vulnerable by adaptive
attack, we will store the data and inspect for adaptive attack pattern before update the filters and
outlier detection methods.
The basic workflows from the figure 5.4:
1. Input will be sent for filters to extract different metrics (SNR, Histogram etc). There will be
a dynamic selection of the filter set from the filter library.
2. Extracted filter metrics value will check for perturb, if it is above certain threshold switch
S1 will open or other wise switch s2 and s3 will open.
3. S1 open:
• input will be sent to adversarial dataset and the process will terminate.
• Adversarial dataset will retrain the filter sequence search for noise detection and
change the threshold value.
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4. S3 and S2 open:
• If S3 open, extracted filter metrics value will be sent to outlier detection system.
• If S2 open, input data will be sent to ML model and Switch S5.
5. ML model will deliver the output class to S4 and outlier detection system.
6. Outlier detection system will randomly pick one outlier detection method. If it detected as
outlier witch s1 will open, otherwise S4 and S5 will open.
7. S1 open:
• input will be sent to adversarial dataset and the process will terminate.
• Adversarial dataset will retrain the filter sequence search for noise detection and
change the threshold value.
8. S4 and S5 open:
• S4 will provide the final output class and S5 will send the input to clean dataset which
will trigger the retrain of outlier methods and change the outlier decision boundary.

5.3
5.3.1

Workflow
Multi-objective Genetic Search for filters

We need multiple filter sequences because we cannot use the same sequence of filter for every
input. A sequence could be any length. Search for optimal set of sequences require significant
computational time, if we do exhaustive search, considering multiple objectives. That’s why we
will employ a multi-objective GA to search for the optimal set of sequences as pareto-front
solutions. For search filters, we need to consider different factors besides their accuracy. Based on
our objective, our filters need to be fast, that’s why order of filters are important because different
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Figure 5.5: Illustration of proposed Dual Inspection framework. If the input is not adversarial, the
original input (not the processed) be sent to the learning model/ML and after ML produce class
label, that labels latent space will be used in outlier method. Selection of outlier and filer sequence
will be dynamic.
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Figure 5.6: GA to search appropriate filters.
order of filters require different amounts of processing times. It is preferable to have our solutions
time efficient. If we have N number of filters, then total possible number of sequences will be our
search space. If we do not consider time efficiency, then we do not need to order in a combination
of sequence (For different order a sequence accuracy remain static but time efficiency change).
We can optimize our search space by limiting the minimum sequence length and maximum
sequence length. So, our search space equation will be :

OptimizedSearchspace =

NX
−max
k=min

N!
N ! − k!

(5.1)

Here, min and max are the minimum and maximum length of a filter sequence. Suppose, we have
17 filters and minimum length were 6, then our optimized experimental search space has consists
of 9.6614 search item. It justifies the necessity of using heuristics search method like GA. In
summary, we need a time-efficient, to produce a reliable performance and a unique set of
sequence. Our designed multi-objective GA can achieve all these criteria. The purpose of using a
genetic search is to find a diverse sequence of filters detecting AAs with maximum accuracy
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while each filter is having distinctive characteristics and capabilities when deployed such a
sequence adaptively (interchangeably) in a ML that will be unpredictable to attackers compared
to a static ensemble of well-known filters. So, the GA will find not only the best filter ensemble,
but also a set of diverse filter sequences in multi-objective Pareto-front.
Perturb Range/threshold Determination of filters
First, we need to process the clean dataset and run all the filters and calculate their metrics value
and gather their Mean,Std Dev, Max. Using algorithm for each filter. Now, if Mean is µ̄, Standard
deviation is σ, Our lower range (Lr ) and upper range(Ur ) calculation denoted by equation 5.2 and
5.3
Lr = M in −

σ
µ̄

(5.2)

Ur = M ax +

σ
µ̄

(5.3)

Using equation 5.2,5.3 for 17 filters, we generated list of upper and lowerange
Encoding
First, we encoded all filters according to table 4.2. Here, 17 algorithms were assigned sequence
number F T 1, F T 2...F T 17. These filters are our genes. We will create our
individuals/chromosome using these genes. We generated the population by random sequence
generation using the genes. So, each sequence is consists of different length of filters. We remove
multiple occurrences of filters in a single sequence. As example a random sequence
F T 2F T 5F T 11F T 12 means Blur -Census - Morph - Canny. That way, we generated multiple
lengths of sequences as our initial population.
Fitness function
We have three objectives. they are Accuracy (α), time to detection(β) and Insider diverseness(γ)
of filters in sequence. Accuracy is the success rate of detection by the filters. The filter sequence
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takes adversarial and clean samples from the dataset. Based on the filter sequence’s metrics value
range, we check how many adversarial samples we can detect and how many we falsely detected.
We used F1 score as Accuracy value.
α(S) = F 1

(5.4)

For time, if each filter take ti time, then total time to detection δt can be calculated by

β(S) =

n
X

t

(5.5)

i=0

For insider diverseness, for each filer fi ∈ Fi , here F is the filter family and f is the filter, S is the
sequence.
P
γ(S) =

f ∈ F |f ∩ S| > 0
P
F

(5.6)

We normalized all three objective data using equation 5.7

Xsc =

X − Xmin
.
Xmax − Xmin

(5.7)

We inversed the Time data, so, we have to maximize all of the objectives. Our fitness function
denoted by
max(f(S)) = ((αn (S)), (βn (S)), (δn (S)))

(5.8)

where, αn is normalized accuracy, βn is normalized inverse time, δn is diverseness factors.
We have penalty function to prioritize simpler solution and weight values to speed up the
GA process. We observed that, in the beginning α is low and after a certain iteration γ gets lower.
We use W0 for α and W1 for γ as weigh value.
For penalty functions we need below parameters
Length of Best fitted individual in previous iteration | maxf (Si ) ∈ ∀(S)|
Size of current Sequence = |S|
P
Total number of filters = ni=0 |f | ∈ ∀F
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Equation for penalty function value can be denoted by

pf(S) =

f(S) |S| − | maxf (Si ) ∈ ∀(S)|
Pn
×
100
i=0 |f | ∈ ∀(F )

(5.9)

So, from equation 5.8, fitness for S is

f(S) =

p
(αn (S)2 × W0 + βn (S)2 + δn (S))2 × W1 − pf(S)

(5.10)

Crossover, mutation and selection
We used an elitist strategy with rank Selection [46] and kept the best performing filters for the
next generation in steady-state genetic search. We used PMX crossover as the order of the filter
sequence are important optimization criteria in a sequence[200]. In the figure 5.6, We illustrated
the genetic search of near-optimal filter sequences where search terminated after specific
iterations or if the fitness values do not improve for a long period i.e. threshold number of
iterations.

5.3.2

One class classifications Outlier method

There will be different latent spaces for each class to detect that class’s outlier. In the figure 5.7,
we can see that MNIST digits have their clusters for each class label, and these are well separable.
In the figure 5.8, we can see filter-based metrics can very easily differentiate between adversarial
and clean sample. We suggest using an ensemble of different outlier detection methods—for
example, a combination of One-class SVM, Isolation forest, and Negative selection algorithm.
Our experimental results shows that negative selection algorithm is random nonlinear learning
system, which is applicable for adversarial detection and it randomness made is easy to make the
system adaptive by regular updating the learning model.
In the table 5.2, we experimented the attack sample accuracy rate with v-detector
generated using different number of clean samples. It is observed that after each iteration
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Figure 5.7: PCA based clustering for class label 0, and 1 from MNIST dataset using each class
own latent space.

Figure 5.8: FGSM based adversarial input differs from their target class using filtered metrics
presented using PCA for dimensional reduction.

Attack type
FGSM
BIM
PGD

Step1
0.86
0.89.0
0.92

Step2
0.92
90.0
0.94

Step3
0.902
90.0
0.95

Step4
0.93
0.90
0.95

Table 5.2: Detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with clean
input of class label ’0’ , after sample size increased 100 in each step.
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Attack type
FGSM
BIM
PGD
MBIM
HSJ
JSMA
CW
DF

NSA
0.93
0.90
0.95
0.91
0.88
0.9
0.96
0.91

OCSVM
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.98
0.55
0.56
0.42
0.45

IF
0.93
0.91
0.92
0.94
0.41
0.8
0.66
0.76

VAE
0.65
0.66
0.50
0.46
0.65
0.83
0.52
0.55

SOGAL
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

MOGAL
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

Table 5.3: detection of adversarial inputs which classified as MNIST class label ’0’ and with clean
input of class label ’0’.
v-detector performance slightly increased. In the table 5.3, we compare v-detector NSA results
with other techniques; we can see that OCSVM and IF performs better than NSA for
gradient-based attacks for low noise attacks NSA outperforms both of them. Variable
Autoencoder did not perform well due to a low number of samples. SOGAL and MOGAL based
techniques were also failed to work with low models.

5.3.3

Adaptiveness and dynamic selection

We randomly choose different filter sequence and other outlier methods to keep the system
dynamic for each input. After each input, the outlier detection modules are updated by changing
their decision boundaries, making the detection filters adaptive. However, the filter sequence can
change, and the noise threshold value gets updated after each MOGA run. This makes common
adaptive attacks ineffective as each input continuously updates the defense strategy. An adaptive
attacker will first send random clean input. And started to add some noise in these inputs and send
repeatedly until the classification result changes. That way adaptive attackers will know the
decision boundary of the learning model. Then adaptive attacker will start creating input that is
close to the decision boundary in the representation space.
In our method, attackers have to bypass our dynamic and changing adversarial detection
method, which decision boundary is not affected by the actual learning model. If our filter set or
outlier detector method was static this method would work, but dynamic selection of filterset and
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outlier detection method will make it hard to formulate the adaptive attack. Additionally, after a
certain set of inputs, we will regenerate negative detector sets by considering these new inputs as
self data. So, entire outliers decision parameter would change and the adaptive attacker will not
able to establish a fixed decision boundary line for adversarial and nonadversarial input data as
adaptive attacker is looking for class classification boundary not adversarial and non-adversarial
decision boundary. This update method can also be vulnerable to adaptive attacks which aim to
bias the method accuracy, we added a adaptive attack detection module before update/retrain our
adversarial detection techniques.
In the adaptive attack detection module, we will analyze distributions of last certain
number of inputs are align with total distributions of inputs. We will use the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness of Fit Test (K-S test) compares data with a known distribution
and lets us know if they have the same distribution. This test is nonparametric as it doesn’t
assume any particular underlying distribution[16]. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test determines a
null hypothesis, H0 , that the two samples originate from the same distribution. Then we explore
for evidence that this hypothesis should be rejected and formulate this as probability ρ. If the
prospect of the samples being from different distributions tops a confidence level we reject the
original hypothesis and accept hypothesis H1 , which stated that the two samples are from
different distributions. Based on the KS distribution table, if ρ <

1.22
√
n

(where n= number of stored

input) than the stored input has inputs from adaptive attack. We disregarded those samples as
these may create data bias in our defense learning system.
In summary, our adaptive defense mechanism consists of the following properties
• Dynamic selection of filter set sequence which will make it harder to formulate adaptive
attack based on known filter knowledge.
• Dynamic selection of outlier detection method, it will make the adaptive attack to consider
all outlier detection method when developing attack input that will make generating input
computationally expensive.
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• Defense is always learning which will continue changing the filter sequences and decision
boundary of outlier detection models. It will make an adaptive attack difficult to search
decision boundary.
• To protect against continuous query-based attacks, we will monitor and analyze input
trends using the K-S test. The number of inputs considered for the K-S test will be
dynamic. Formulate a query-based attack on the defense system will be hard due to the
randomness of the K-S test sample number. Our input trend detection system can
effectively monitor adaptive attacks and able to take countermeasure.
Our defense properties will make the state of the art adaptive attack ineffective and it will
make computationally harder to formulate new adaptive attacks. Our proposed approach has a
cold start problem as in the beginning we have empty adversarial and clean dataset. That’s why
outlier detection or filter based inspection does not start working until significant samples in the
clean and adversarial dataset. Also, we assume that the first set of samples are clean, otherwise
outlier detection gets train with noisy data. For the MNIST dataset, we observed 250 random
samples required for each class to detect outliers using OCSVM and Isolation forest.

5.4
5.4.1

Experiments
Dataset Generation

We did a comprehensive experiment with MNIST and CFIAR-10. We did extensive testing with
the MNIST dataset for all the 10 classes and with the full dataset. We did CFIAR testing with two
classes. After that, we evaluated our method using EMNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and IMAGENET
data-set which re-validated our methodology. We generated FGSM, JSMA, and CW samples to
test the results. We generated 100,000 FGSM samples using LENET-5. LeNet-5 LeNet-5 CNN
architecture is made up of 7 layers. The layer composition consists of 3 convolutional layers, 2
subsampling layers and 2 fully connected layers. For JSMA we generated 100,000 JSMA
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((a)) All clean data projected using t-sne visualiza- ((b)) All clean and adversarial data projected t-sne
tion with class labels.
visualization with class labels.
Figure 5.9: Experimental data representation space for each class of MNIST digits.
samples using a CNN. CNN architecture is made up of 5 layers. The layer composition consists
of 3 convolutional layers, 1 flatten and 1 dense layers. All of the activation functions are using
RELU. and last we generated 100,000 CW samples using VGG-16 neural net.
To establish the ground truth for our research we used 30000 clean image samples, 10000
FGSM, 10000 JSMA and 10000 CW attack samples on MNIST dataset. For filtering operation
we picked 14 filters using python opencv library. They are medianblur, GaussianBlur,
AverageBlur, Bilateral blur, AdditivePoissonNoise, AdditiveGaussianNoise ,Erode TopHat
,Blackhat ,Morphology gradient ,Opening ,Closing, Dialte filter. We apply the filer in the image
and than extracted difference between original image and the filtered image. After that we
measure the average and standard deviation of white color histogram for the extracted image and
horizontal and vertical signal to noise ration for the extracted image.
In the figure 5.9 ’b’ we visualized how adversarial (FGSM+JSMA+CW) inputs of one
class label overlap with other class label compared with ’a’ where only clean inputs where
presented. This shows that adversarial samples are hard to distinguish between class labels. In the
figure 5.10, we represented all inputs with their adversarial attack type along side the clean input.
Here blues are the clean one. We can see here the FGSM which is visualized with red are not
overlapping with clean one or other attack type much. But JSMA and CW are highly overlapping
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((a)) All clean and adversarial data projected using ((b)) All clean and adversarial data projected using 3
PCA reduction and t-sne conversion.
PCA components.
Figure 5.10: Experimental data representation space(Here clean is green, red is FGSM, blue is
JSMA and yellow is CW).

((a)) All clean and adversarial data projected after ((b)) All clean and adversarial data projected after
applied 14 filters SNR values.
applied 14 filters average histogram values.
Figure 5.11: Experimental data representation space after filter applied with one metrics(Here
clean is green, red is FGSM, blue is JSMA and yellow is CW).
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((a)) All clean and adversarial data projected after ((b)) All clean and adversarial data projected after
applied 14 filters SNR and Histogram average valuesapplied 14 filters SNR and Histogram average values
(Here clean is blue, red is FGSM, green is JSMA and(here blue is clean and red is fgsm,jsma and cw.
yellow is CW).
Figure 5.12: Experimental data representation space after filter applied with two metrics.
with each one and also partially with clean one. CW inputs are more overlapping with clean
samples.
In the figure 5.11, we represented the adversarial and clean samples after applying 14
filters. in the figure ’a’ of 5.11, we represented the SNR values of the images and it showed
FGSM (blue) samples are very easily separable but JSMA (red) and CW(yellow) are hard to
separate using SNR values only. However, JSMA are more separable but CW and clean samples
are completely overlapping. in the figure ’b’ of 5.11, we illustrated using histogram value and it
made CW more separable than the clean ones. In the figure 5.12, we applied both SNR and
histogram metrics together, and it visible that adversarial and clean samples are now more easily
separable. In the figure ’b’ of 5.12 blues are the clean samples and re are the adversarial samples.
We can see some clean samples are overlapping with adversarial samples but other way is rare. In
the figure ’a’ we presented the adversarial attack type two and we see some CW samples are also
overlapping with clean samples but it is negligible.
In the figure 5.13, we presented each class label adversarial and clean data both without
adversarial classification and with adversarial classifications. This visual presentation shows that,
when we each class as inlier and all other as outlier, than adversarial samples were more easily
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((a)) MNIST ’0’ with ((b)) MNIST ’0’ with ((c)) MNIST ’1’ with ((d)) MNIST ’1’ with
FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW to-FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW toarately
gether
arately
gether

((e)) MNIST ’2’ with ((f)) MNIST ’2’ with ((g)) MNIST ’3’ with ((h)) MNIST ’3’ with
FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW to-FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW toarately
gether
arately
gether

((i)) MNIST ’4’ with ((j)) MNIST ’4’ with ((k)) MNIST ’5’ with ((l)) MNIST ’5’ with
FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW to-FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW toarately
gether
arately
gether

((m)) MNIST ’6’ with ((n)) MNIST ’6’ with ((o)) MNIST ’7’ with ((p)) MNIST ’7’ with
FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW to-FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW toarately
gether
arately
gether

((q)) MNIST ’8’ with ((r)) MNIST ’8’ with ((s)) MNIST ’9’ with ((t)) MNIST ’9’ with
FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW to-FGSM, JSMA and CW sep-FGSM, JSMA and CW toarately
gether
arately
gether
Figure 5.13: Experimental data representation space
124 for each class of MNIST digits with adversarial attack Here clean is blue, red is fgsma, green is JSMA and yellow is CW).

detectable.
Model

AUC

CA

F1

Precision

Recall

LogLoss

Specificity

Random Forest

0.973

0.845

0.844

0.844

0.845

0.412

0.926

kNN

0.870

0.643

0.624

0.626

0.643

0.753

0.810

Naive Bayes

0.794

0.562

0.444

0.367

0.562

0.947

0.691

Neural Network

0.815

0.573

0.501

0.629

0.573

0.919

0.763

SVM

0.527

0.523

0.399

0.434

0.523

2.073

0.606

Logistic Regression

0.813

0.566

0.489

0.442

0.566

0.952

0.724

Table 5.4: Adversarial type classification for MNIST dataset for Clean, FGSM, JSMA, and CW.

Model

AUC

CA

F1

Precision

Recall

LogLoss

Specificity

Random Forest

0.998

0.970

0.970

0.970

0.970

0.154

0.985

kNN

0.966

0.844

0.840

0.837

0.844

0.332

0.928

Naive Bayes

0.914

0.737

0.740

0.749

0.737

0.613

0.916

Neural Network

0.951

0.816

0.810

0.807

0.816

0.420

0.919

SVM

0.860

0.302

0.208

0.681

0.302

1.598

0.853

Logistic Regression

0.937

0.790

0.783

0.778

0.790

0.473

0.910

Table 5.5: Binary classification for MNIST dataset for Clean and Adversarial ( FGSM, JSMA, and
CW).
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Model

AUC

CA

F1

Precision

Recall

LogLoss

Specificity

Random Forest

1.000

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.007

1.000

kNN

0.999

0.984

0.984

0.984

0.984

0.038

0.995

Naive Bayes

0.999

0.983

0.983

0.984

0.983

0.203

0.994

Neural Network

1.000

0.998

0.998

0.998

0.998

0.008

0.999

SVM

0.896

0.590

0.531

0.815

0.590

1.317

0.864

Logistic Regression

0.999

0.983

0.983

0.983

0.983

0.056

0.994

Table 5.6: Adversarial type classification for MNIST dataset for Clean, FGSM, JSMA, and CW
after applied histogram and SNR based features.

Model

AUC

CA

F1

Precision

Recall

LogLoss

Specificity

Random Forest

1.000

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.002

0.998

kNN

1.000

0.998

0.998

0.998

0.998

0.005

0.995

Naive Bayes

0.998

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.042

0.997

Neural Network

1.000

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.005

0.997

SVM

0.996

0.753

0.652

0.814

0.753

0.563

0.265

Logistic Regression

0.999

0.997

0.997

0.997

0.997

0.017

0.992

Table 5.7: Binary classification for MNIST dataset for Clean and Adversarial ( FGSM, JSMA, and
CW) after apply SNR and Histogram features.

In the table 5.4, we used 6 different learning method to differentiate between clean and
adversarial attack type using image pixel information, it is evident that random forest performs
better than others and in the 5.5, we converted in as binary problem where only clean and
adversarial input was classified. SVM method performed very poorly as the representation spaces
was not linear. But random forest performs well that other methods. But when we applied SNR
and Histogram feature based classification all other method except SVM started to performs well
and neural network started to outperforms other methods as presented in table 5.6 and 5.7.
In the table 5.8, we presented the identification of different class labels correctly using
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0
1
2
3
4
Actual
5
6
7
8
9

Predicted
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
96.7 % 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
0.5 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.7 % 0.6 % 0.2 % 32
0.2 % 97.5 % 0.3 % 0.3 %
0.3 % 0.4 % 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 33
0.4 % 0.3 % 95.4 % 0.6 %
0.8 % 0.8 % 0.7 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.1 % 32
0.6 % 0.3 % 0.5 % 95.4 %
0.7 % 0.6 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.7 % 0.2 % 32
0.5 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 96.4 %
0.3 % 0.5 % 0.1 % 0.5 % 0.3 % 32
0.6 % 0.5 % 0.7 % 0.6 %
0.7 % 95.1 %
0.6 % 0.6 % 0.6 % 0.2 % 32
0.5 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.3 %
0.5 % 0.5 % 96.5 %
0.2 % 0.4 % 0.1 % 32
0.3 % 0.5 % 0.3 % 0.3 %
0.6 % 0.4 % 0.3 % 96.8 %
0.3 % 0.2 % 32
0.5 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.1 %
0.3 % 0.3 % 0.6 % 0.5 % 96.5 %
0.4 % 33
0.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.3 %
0.2 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 98.5 % 32
3275
3334
3224
3225
3295
3227
3271
3307
3331
3266 327

Table 5.8: Confusion matrix of MNIST adversarial input detections using SNR and histogram
value.
SNR and histogram value-based checking. We used Random-forest learning. It is seen that some
classes are harder to identify than other class labels. As an example, class 2 and 3 is harder than
identify adversarial class for input label 9.
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5.4.2

Result Analysis
MNIST

CFIAR

Models Used
FGSM

JSMA

CW

FGSM

JSMA

CW

MCD

0.9846

0.99

0.9101

0.8616

0.864

0.7871

OCSVM

0.6851

0.697

0.5421

0.8731

0.535

0.5417

LMDD

0.6673

0.601

0.553

0.5752

0.561

0.5965

LOF

0.997

0.912

0.93

0.8963

0.832

0.8096

COF

0.3991

0.37

0.3568

CBLOF

0.9866

0.959

0.9

HBOS

0.9865

0.915

0.9

0.8354

0.859

0.0016

KNN

0.9993

0.909

0.9628

0.9957

0.925

0.0682

SOD

0.3842

0.461

0.3831

ABOD

0.9994

0.999

0.9776

0.9982

0.922

0.8881

COPD

0.9273

0.996

0.8105

0.8255

0.803

0.7099

SOS

0.4551

0.37

FB

0.9942

0.99

0.9692

0.8863

0.839

0.7716

IF

0.9933

0.97

0.89

0.8444

0.834

0.6339

LSCP

0.9992

0.9

0.9832

0.8982

0.827

0.78

XGBOD

0.5

0.5

0.59

LODA

0.9703

0.99

0.91

0.7766

0.661

0.6286

AE

0.6738

0.73

0.62

VAE

0.8833

0.78

0.7

SOGAL

0.4

0.3

0.3

MOGAL

0.2

0.374

0.34

V-Detector

0.98

0.99

0.94

0.99

0.86

0.78

Table 5.9: Comparison of results with different outlier detection models to compare V-detector
NSA performance with other OCC methods.
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In the table 5.9, we compared v-detector performance on MNIST digits (0-9) as illustrated in
figure 5.13 and 4 class’s of CFIAR-10 dataset. Our result shows that v-detector outperforms other
out-lire detector consistently for all attack type and dataset.
Attack
FGSM
BIM
PGD
MBIM
HSJ
JSMA
CW

CFIAR ’CAT’
0.93
0.90
0.95
0.91
0.84
0.7
0.76

CFIAR ’Truck’
0.92
0.90
0.92
0.90
0.65
0.76
0.67

CFIAR ’DOG’
0.93
0.91
0.92
0.94
0.80
0.7
0.66

CFIAR ’Ship’
0.92
0.71
0.90
0.96
0.65
0.73
0.62

Imagenet ’gorilla’
0.68
0.83
0.73
0.73
0.63

Table 5.10: adversarial attacks on CFIAR and Imagenet detection rate (each class has 200 positive
and 200 adversarial samples which classifies as that class by a Alexnet for imagenet and VGG-16
for CFIAR).
In the table 5.10, we presented results using similar experiments we used for ground truth
experiments. Our performance of CFIAR and IMAGENET is very good compare to the
state-of-the-art attack. Also, a good portion of false positives was failed adversarial examples due
to perturbation loss while converting physical form. This result verifies that the same filters and
histogram, SNR-based methods are applicable for all datasets of the same domain. We also tried
to formulate BPDA attack against our defense but failed to formulate the attack.
When we were evaluating our defense against an advanced attack (with very low
noises/perturbs) we observed that as all adversarial attack types aim to reduce the perturbation in
advanced attack types, the magnitude of perturbation gets so small that they get vanished in
rounded values when converting to visual form. Kurkin and Yan Goodfellow in their paper
describe this phenomenon of destruction rate by the below equation [112]. Our results in
imagenet dataset also effected by this phenomenon.
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Imagen

5.5

Comparison

In table 5.11, we compared our results with other techniques; it is exhibited that our defense’s
performance is similar to other defense techniques, but our defense technique has some
advantages over those like our model does not modify the ML model, it is impossible to have an
adaptive attack on our defense. ML model efficiency does not reduce; instead, results get
re-verified thus improve trustworthiness. However, the efficiency of our approach largely depends
on the individual accuracy of outlier detection methods and noise detection filter sequences.
AML Detection Method
RF[81]
KNN [81]
SVM [81]
Feature Squeezing[215]
Ensemble [15]
Decision Mismatch[141]
Image quality features [6]
(Our Framework)

FGSM
0.96
0.98
0.98
1.00
0.99
0.93
1.00
1.00

MNIST
JSMA HSJ
0.84
0.98
0.80
0.98
0.89
0.98
1.00
0.45
0.93
0.91
0.90
1.00
1.00
1.00

CW
0.66
0.6
1.00

FGSM
0.64
0.56
0.69
0.20
0.99
0.93
0.72
0.98

CIFAR
JSMA HSJ
0.63
0.60
0.52
0.52
0.69
0.64
0.88
0.77
0.42
0.97
0.91
0.70
0.68
0.98
0.99

Avg
CW
0.72
0.69
0.77
0.94

0.77
0.73
0.81
0.77
0.71
0.93
0.83
0.99

Table 5.11: Here, we provided a comparison with other adversarial input detection techniques
based on Accuracy. On average, we outperforms other methods. As examples, our methods work
with 99% accuracy in the CFIAR data-set where the feature squeezing technique has 0.88% accuracy.
Adversarial training diminishes the ML model’s accuracy and can make the ML model
more exposed to generalization [160]. Another disadvantage of Adversarial training based
defense techniques is that we need to retrain the model whenever some new attack samples are
discovered. It will be hard to update all deployed ML models. Our strategy does not require any
dataset not it changes ML anyway, thus no effect on ML model performance. Most
pre-processing techniques reduce the adversarial effect before sending it to the ML model. The
major drawback of these techniques is that their processing techniques are static; they do not
evolve alongside the attack. Our strategy updates itself, it is not vulnerable to this type of adaptive
attack. We also have a detection technique module which can detect adaptive attack query.
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Distillation techniques work by combining the double model, and the second model uses the first
model knowledge to improve accuracy. The black-box attack’s recent improvement makes this
out-of-date defense [33]. The strong transfer-potential of adversarial samples across neural
network models [151] is the main reason for this method’s collapse. It is not robust as simplistic
variation in a neural network can make the system exposed to attacks [30]. The advantage of our
approach over defense distillation is we do not need to modify the neural network. Our proposed
approach does not need to know or change any ML model layer. So, our model remains the same
for both black box and white box attack methods. [82] concluded that combining/ensemble weak
defenses does not automatically improve a system’s robustness. Also, the ensemble technique
remains static and vulnerable to a new attack. Our proposed solution selects defense technique
(filer method and outlier detection method) dynamically, thus it is robust and auto-updating
decision boundaries also defend against query-based attacks. Feature squeezing [215] method
reduces the data, and it reduces the accuracy of the ML model. There is no such reduction in
actual model accuracy in our proposed solution. [171] proposed a mechanism to leverage the
power of Generative Adversarial Networks to decrease adversarial perturbations’ efficiency. The
GAN efficiency depends on the GAN training, which is computationally complicated and needs
proper datasets, whereas our system does not need a complicated training method.

5.6

Robustness Evaluation

Many adversarial defenses are often empirically shown to be robust against the existing attacks,
however new stronger attacks are later found to break such defense. For instance, defensive
distillation and adversarial training against the FGSM) were shown to be useless against more
potent attacks, for example, Carlini-wagner attack. So, we need to develop successful defenses
against all attacks within a particular class. But compute this is computationally expensive due to
the nature of model complexity and the existence of vastly different types of machine learning
models.
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According to the literature[178], We can define Robustness Verification as a process that
certifies the lower bound of a learning model strength against adversarial attacks in varying
constrained conditions. An well-known example is L∞-bounded attack[47]. There are two
primary categories of robustness verification methods. These are deterministic and probabilistic
verification. Deterministic verification approaches able to identify strength of input against
adversarial attacks. But the probabilistic verification methods only work with a specific
probability (e.g. 99.9%).
Li et al.[120] stated that "An algorithm A is certified as a robustness verification approach,
if for any (x0 , y0 ), as long as there exists x ∈ Bp (x0 ) with Fθ (x) 6= y0 (adversarial example),
A(fθ , x0 , y0 , ) = f alse(deterministic verification) or P r[A(fθ , x0 , y0 , ) = f alse] ≥ 1 − α
(probabilistic verification), where α is a pre-defined small threshold. By definition, a robustness
verification approach A provides a sufficient condition for model robustness. If A also provides a
necessary condition for model robustness, A is said to be complete, otherwise incomplete."
The robust training approaches are usually extended from adversarial training. Adversarial
training[47] is a powerful defense which approximately solves the min-max problem where we
need reduce the regular loss function such as cross entropy. In ML, we have an estimator δ that is
used to estimate a θ ∈ Θ We also assume a risk function R(θ, δ), usually specified as the integral
of a loss function. In this framework, δ̃ is called minmax problem if it satisfies
θ R(θ, δ̃)

= ∞δθ R(θ, δ)[]

The inner maximization of Minmax problem is hard to solve due to nonconvexity, and is
usually approximated by empirical attacks such as basic iterative attack methods. In the figure
5.14 we describes several methods to determine robustness of adversarial training process
however as these are only work for whitebox models. Our defense model works on only input
data and and we consider learning models as a blackbox which are not comparable to existing
defense model robustness lower bound. In the table 5.12, different probabilistic method was
presented which used to evaulate robustness in adversarial training. As our method is not
adversarial training we can not use these either.
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Figure 5.14: Different robustness verification techniques [120]

Verification

Robust Training

Robustness Verification Approaches
Differential Privacy Based [116]
Neyman-Pearson Based [43]
f -Divergence [40]
Re´nyi divergence Based [118]
Data Augmentation[163]
Adversarial Training citesilva2020opportunities,li2020sok
Adversarial + Pretraining[178, 120]
MACER [223]
ADRE [57]

Adversaries in Evaluation
L1,L2
L1, L2, L∞
L1
L2
L1, L2, L∞
L2
L2
L2
L2

Table 5.12: Different probabilistic method for adversarial robustness
Carlini mentioned [carlinini2019evaulating], evaluating adversarial defense robustness
should be measure by following a collection of recommendations that they identified as common
flaws in adversarial example defense evaluations. In our machine learning adversarial threat
model we consider all of these flaws.
Further study is possible to explore measurement of robustness lower bound for input
inspection based strategy, We hope this would be a research opportunities for future researchers in
this field.

5.7

Summary

In summary, any commercial product that is using advanced machine/deep/reinforcement
learning can benefit from our innovative DF technique.
• Use of commutative dual filtering technique in any AI/ML–based utility applications.
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• Use of negative filtering will prevent Trojan AI to change decision resulting in robust
AI/ML systems.
• Easy to incorporate in existing and future ML systems will increase adoption and deploy
ability.
• Enhanced performance/accuracy and robustness of ML products and online services will
increase in diverse applications.
• Improved security will result in quality of experience of users.
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Chapter 6
Real-World Application

Figure 6.1: Medical Imaging Dataset
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6.1

Proof-of-the-Concept Prototype

I developed a Django web service which can evaluate medical image if they are adversarial or not.
This dataset is a simple MNIST-style medical images in 64x64 dimension; There were originally
taken from other datasets and processed into such style. There are 58954 medical images
belonging to 6 classes. They are:
• AbdomenCT
• BreastMRI
• CXR
• ChestCT
• Hand
• HeadCT

6.2

Experiments

We experiment with FGSM, CW and JSMA dataset, and the accuracy of detection rate is 98% by
input filters and 100% by the output filter.

6.3

Scope and Limitations

This service provide a Rest API which can be use by any medical ML model to check the input
and the output. The work of output filter is limited here as output filters work only based on
medical image class not the diagnosis result class.
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6.4

Lessons Learned

I have designed an adaptive filtering methodology that does not require any modification to the
ML model or information inside the ML model. Our strategy can implement in any ML-based
system without costly pre-training. It is to be noted that current adaptive attacks are ineffective in
our defense. As our method verify the input and the ML model output with non-obvious diverse
inspection and secondary (outlier) detection, the results exhibited that it could increase the
trustworthiness of the ML model applications. I focused our experiments on the computer vision
domain, but our techniques are suitable for other domains (audio, text, time series). I am planning
to expand our test in different domains and enrich our filter collection for better performance. I
plan to deploy this as a library so any ML model developer can use our framework as an extension
for his ML for security purposes. Our technique can be tuned between speed and accuracy; also,
as it is independent of the ML, making the framework suitable for privacy.
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